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Hate By Association:
Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for Persecution
Jacob A. Ramer*
Far from being a vehicle for revenge, it is a tool for promoting reconciliation and restoring true peace. If
responsibility for the appalling crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia is not attributed to individuals,
then whole ethnic and religious groups will be held accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal.
In other words, "collective responsibility" – a primitive and archaic concept – will gain the upper hand;
eventually whole groups will be held guilty of massacres, torture, rape, ethnic cleansing, the wanton
destruction of cities and villages. The history of the region clearly shows that clinging to feelings of
"collective responsibility" easily degenerates into resentment, hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to
further violence and new crimes. 1

Introduction
Perpetrating heinous acts against another solely on the basis of "otherness" has been a
common theme throughout human history. Whether it has been due to ethnic, racial, religious or
political differences, certain governments and private actors have attempted to cleanse their
territory of the "pollution" that appeared to threaten their ideology or existence. 2 Oftentimes,
purging campaigns resulted in mass death, such as during the Spanish Inquisition, which claimed
tens of thousands of suspected non-believers. Although the Holocaust was the most well-known,
and certainly most well-organized, instance of persecution in the twentieth century, it does not lie
in isolation. During World I, the Turkish government killed approximately 1.5 million
Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge oversaw
the deaths of up to three million people, a large portion because they were non-Cambodian or did

* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006. The author would like to thank Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. of
Chicago-Kent College of Law for his insight and continued mentorship, as well as Dr. Avril McDonald for the
opportunity to work with her on issues of international humanitarian law at T.M.C. Asser Institute in The Hague,
The Netherlands.
1
Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N.
GAOR/SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007, ¶ 16 (Aug. 29, 1994).
2
See generally BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., MORAL PURITY AND PERSECUTION IN HISTORY (2000).
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not square with the communist regime's remaking of Cambodian society. Many other notable
examples easily come to mind.
Persecution is frequently associated with death, but death, whether widespread or not, is
not necessary for there to have been persecution. Persecution may manifest itself through other
violent means, or it may rear its head through the restraint of access to the necessities of life.
The overarching belief, though, is that the "other" is always viewed by what it is not. 3 Thus, the
application is easy, regardless of location, language, belief system, or any other means of
distinguishing oneself from another.
For centuries, ruthless leaders and culpable underlings escaped retribution for their
policies; if they did suffer consequences, it was only at the hands of a violent coup or a
conquering people, usually resulting in their summary execution. The regime of international
criminal law seeks to reverse the long-standing cynical notion that "one murder makes a villain;
millions a hero." 4 But if anyone was ever to be held liable for policies that led to incalculable
deaths, the most complex question, both in practical and theoretical terms, has been how to
individualize responsibility when countless people participated. Modern international law, as
has always been the case in municipal law, now imposes individual—rather than collective—
criminal responsibility for actions deemed contrary to humanity.
This article considers the crime of persecution in international criminal law and how it
has collided with the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise ("JCE") at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). The first section of this article briefly discusses
the emergence of individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law. The second
section analyzes the doctrine of JCE, including its legal underpinnings in jurisprudence arising
3

Id. at 3.
BEILBY PORTEUS, DEATH: A POETICAL ESSAY, Line 154 (1759). Beilby Porteus (1731-1809) was the bishop of
London and a staunch abolitionist.
4
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from World War II, its modern formulation at the ICTY, and its similarities to conspiracy and
accomplice liability in the U.S. The doctrine of JCE liability attributes one's actions to another if
both were part of a common criminal plan. Through the third of three categories of JCE liability,
an individual may be vicariously liable for another's acts if those acts are a foreseeable
consequence of the joint enterprise. The third section examines the origins and elements of the
crime of persecution, which is a specific intent crime requiring the intent to discriminate on a
given basis. Because the crime's foundation stems from "crimes against humanity" and is now
considered as a crime against humanity, the elements common to all crimes against humanity are
also addressed. Next, the fourth section considers "hate crimes" legislation in the U.S., and how
their analytical framework can deepen understanding of the proper role between discrimination
and vicarious liability. The fifth section discusses the convergence of specific intent crimes,
namely persecution and genocide, with the doctrine of JCE. The final section proposes two
improvements to the future use of JCE liability.
This article specifically argues that before liability attaches for participation in a JCE, the
individual should have contributed significantly to that enterprise. Minor participation in a
common plan should not be enough to expand liability to far-reaching consequences. The
second modification would be that the third category of JCE should not be used for specific
intent crimes. Attributing the direct perpetrator's thoughts to the non-direct perpetrator, where
that individual did not possess or intend such thoughts, is unjust and should be reconsidered. It
is no longer necessary to find a smoking gun or evidence of a direct order or participation; a
muted form of guilt by association has effectively replaced such requirements.
By incorporating these suggestions, modern international criminal law will refocus its
energies on those most responsible for mass atrocities. International law should not loosely
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apply doctrines that dilute individual responsibility; doing so denigrates the importance of the
very principles these institutions are meant to uphold. Because of the relatively recent
reemergence of individual criminal responsibility, and the political will around the world to
enforce it, there is now a great opportunity to hone international criminal law into a regime that
will never leave the world stage again.

I.

International Law and Individual Criminal Responsibility
Under classical international law, only States held legal personality. If a particular action

was a crime under international law, the State alone was responsible; no international entity
doled out punishments (or benefits) to individual persons. This all changed in the immediate
aftermath of World War II. 5
Prior to the Nuremberg Trial in 1945, individuals were charged under national law,
usually military law, and tried before national courts. 6 The Nuremberg Trial was the first clear
enunciation of the notion that individuals have concrete duties under international law. 7 In order
to justify this new concept, the judges had to make a dramatic analytical leap from the
international treaties they were citing, which mentioned nothing on individual duties, to the
notion of individual criminal responsibility for "crimes" found within those treaties. 8 In

5

See generally Kai Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law: A Jurisprudential
Analysis – From Nuremberg to The Hague, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 5, Vol. I (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000).
6
Andrew Clapham, Issues of complexity, complicity and complementarity: from the Nuremberg trials to the dawn of
the International Criminal Court, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 31 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003).
7
Id. at 30, 31.
8
Id. at 32.

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 34

language familiar to the current politico-legal debate within the U.S. about the nature of a judge's
role, one commentator has characterized what occurred at Nuremberg to be "judicial activism." 9
Attributing individual responsibility to military leaders was not an incredible legal
stretch, though, because military courts had tried leaders for war crimes before. For example, the
Treaty of Versailles granted the Allies power to try individuals before their military courts "for
violations of the laws and customs of war." 10 Holding civilian leaders responsible, on the other
hand, proved much more tenuous. There was no precedent for trying civilians for international
crimes prior to Nuremberg. 11 The "Hang the Kaiser" moniker after World War I never came to
fruition, 12 mostly because the Netherlands granted asylum to him, and international pressure and
interest eventually subsided in the proposition. Despite its unsteady foundation, however, the
concept has been widely accepted and subsequently used. Individual criminal responsibility for
certain acts, whether for military personnel or civilians, has arguably become customary
international law.
Due largely to the Cold War, the leaders of wayward regimes and destructive
paramilitary groups never faced retribution before an international tribunal. If such individuals
ever faced justice, it was usually in the way of summary executions. States meted out
punishment as they deemed fit for their own political purposes, oftentimes without proper trials.

9

Id. Clapham quotes the Nuremberg Judgment, which stated: "The law of war is to be found not only in treaties,
but in the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from general
principles of justice applied by jurists, and practised by military courts. This law is not static, but by continual
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and
define for more accurate reference the principles of law already existing."
10
Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, arts. 228(1), 229(1), (2), Consol. T.S. 225. Germany was supposed to
cooperate and hand over certain identified individuals under Articles 228(2) and 230, but it was uncooperative and
few German nationals ever faced justice, either inside or outside Germany.
11
Richard Overy, The Nuremberg trials: international law in the making, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE:
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 3 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003).
12
Id. at 3. The Treaty of Versailles stated in Article 227(1): "The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign
William II of Hohenzollern, former German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the
sanctity of treaties." Under Article 227(2), an international tribunal was to be set up to try the Kaiser, but he fled
Germany to The Netherlands where he was afforded refuge.
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International law and its fundamental adherence to a strict version of sovereignty did not allow
for interference. Influence and internationally-recognized retribution stopped at the borders.
This "live and let live" attitude finally changed when televisions across the world began to air
shocking images from the Bosnian War and its sister conflicts of the early 1990's.
The international community, horrified by the sight of mass graves and stories of ethnic
cleansing, launched an investigation to determine what crimes, if any, had been committed in the
former Yugoslavia, and who had ordered or participated in such crimes. 13 Tasked with the
investigation, a five-member U.N. commission detailed specific violations of international
humanitarian law, and perhaps more importantly, provided in its report the overall contextual
framework for the conflict. 14 In 1993, before the report was actually complete, the U.N. Security
Council passed a resolution to create an international tribunal to prosecute those involved in the
wars related to the breakup of Yugoslavia. 15 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia opened its doors in 1994 and received its first suspect one year later. This modern
incarnation of individual criminal responsibility before an international tribunal proved highly
valuable to the movement of international criminal law. The creation of the ICTY spurred a
proliferation of tribunals. In 1994, the Security Council established a tribunal to deal with the
atrocities in Rwanda. Internationalized national courts, which incorporate international criminal
law and sit international judges alongside national judges, were also established with
international backing. These "hybrid" courts sprouted up in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East
Timor to address the heinous crimes committed during conflict in their respective territories.
13

S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992). U.N. Security Council
Resolution 780 established a commission of experts to investigate "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
other violations of international humanitarian law" committed in the former Yugoslavia.
14
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
15
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1203
(1993).
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With memories of wide-scale humanitarian violations still fresh in their minds from the early and
mid-1990's, the world came together in Rome in 1998 and finally settled on the creation of the
first permanent institution to try persons accused of crimes such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. 16 Four years later, in 2002, the Rome Statute had enough signatories
to begin setting up the International Criminal Court.
II.

The Development of Joint Criminal Enterprise
The concept of joint criminal enterprise has been called "the most complex and

conceptually challenging theory in international criminal law." 17 Its recent emergence (or reemergence for its staunch defenders) has provoked vigorous debate about its legitimacy. The
origins of the doctrine are generally attributed to events preceding and during World War II, but
despite this early arrival, the ensuing fifty years contributed little, if anything, to the concept,
until the ad hoc tribunals of the 1990's.
Human rights groups herald the imposition of this doctrine and argue that it is grounded
in customary international law. 18 Several international criminal tribunals employ it today. 19

16

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1,
2002).
17
Allison Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility,
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 103 (2005). Danner and Martinez also
note that the Appeals Chamber's judgment in Tadic referred to this concept by a variety of names and used them
interchangeably: "common criminal plan," "common criminal purpose," "common design or purpose," "common
criminal design," "common purpose," "common design," "common concerted design," "criminal enterprise,"
"common enterprise," and "joint criminal enterprise" (citing Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Form of
Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 24, Case No. IT-9936/1 (June 26, 2001)).
18
See, e.g., Bogdan Ivanisevic, 'Crime of Opinion' is One Thing, But War Crime is Another, Human Rights Watch
Commentary (Feb. 11, 2005), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/11/serbia10173.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
19
For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone originally indicted Charles Taylor for his participation in a joint
criminal enterprise that had as its purpose "to take any actions necessary to gain and exercise political power and
control over the territory of Sierra Leone," which included the murder, abduction, forced labor, physical and sexual
violence, the use of child soldiers, and the destruction of civilian structures. Notably, the indictment alleged that
these acts were either within the joint criminal enterprise or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint
criminal enterprise. Prosecutor against Charles Ghankay Taylor, Indictment, The Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Case No. SCSL-03-I (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-01-I-001.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007). The amended indictment dropped the phrase "joint criminal enterprise" and instead referred
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Nowhere does the Statute of the ICTY explicitly provide for the doctrine, yet since its
"introduction" by the Tadic Appeals Chamber decision in 1999, it "has become the magic bullet
of the Office of the Prosecutor." 20 The doctrine had immediate effect at the ICTY, as the
Prosecutor amended earlier indictments to include such liability, most notably in the Milosevic
case. 21 JCE liability appears to have now supplanted others as the favored theory of liability at
the ICTY. 22 The concept has been referred to by many names, but the ICTY has settled on "joint
criminal enterprise" as the preferred term. 23 The following section discusses the doctrine and its
precursors at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as the doctrine's comparison to
vicarious liability in the U.S.

A. The Nuremberg Tribunal
Faced with trying leaders far removed from the battlefields and concentration camps, the
founders and judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal considered several distinct doctrines that are
central to understanding the foundations of vicarious liability in modern international criminal
law. First, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal provided for liability based on
to a "common plan, design or purpose." Prosecutor against Charles Ghankay Taylor, Amended Indictment, The
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-03-I (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.scsl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-01-I-75.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
20
William A. Schabas, The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of the International Criminal
Tribunal Over the Past Decade: Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 1032 (2003). See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter, ICTY
Statute].
21
Shane Darcy, An Effective Measure of Bringing Justice?: The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 AM. INT'L L. REV. 153, 168-69 (2004) (noting that
the first two indictments of Prosecutor v. Milosevic did not include such language, but the second amended
indictment did include an allegation of participation in a joint criminal enterprise and that each individual was
individually liable for transpired acts; the August 2001indictment alleged his participation in a joint criminal
enterprise with Bosnian Serb military and civilian leaders).
22
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Second Amended Indictment, ICTY, Case No. IT-03-66-PT, (Feb. 12, 2004).
The original indictment and first amended indictment did not allege or refer to a joint criminal enterprise.
23
See Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to
Amend, supra note 17, ¶ 24; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction—Joint Criminal Enterprise, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 36, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72 (May 21, 2003).
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membership, and second, the Charter incorporated aspects of conspiracy law. 24 A third doctrine,
common plan or common design liability, which was used by national military authorities in
proceedings following the Nuremberg Tribunal, later contributed to the development of imputed
responsibility. 25 This third doctrine is examined in the discussion relating to the ICTY.
Liability based on membership in a criminal organization can be attributed to Lieutenant
Colonel Murray C. Bernays, a lawyer in the U.S. War Department's three-man "Special Project
Branch," which had been given in September 1944 the job of developing a postwar justice
system for Europe. 26 At that time, the notion of justice imposed through a formal legal process
was far from a foregone conclusion. Throughout the war Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill favored summary executions for those involved in the war, and they continually tried
to persuade the other Allies to go along with the plan. 27 Interestingly, the Soviet Union was the
earliest advocate of a postwar tribunal, largely based on its own experiences with show trials. 28
But despite his early stance and the most vocal camp in his administration arguing for summary
executions, Roosevelt ultimately sided with those in favor of an international tribunal.
With the debate ongoing, Bernays doggedly approached the assignment. Perhaps the two
most difficult issues he had to address were how to punish prewar crimes against German
citizens (including German Jews) and non-Germans, and how to deal with the millions of
Germans who were members of the Nazi party, Gestapo, SS, and other organizations deemed
24

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, arts. 6, 9-10, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945.
25
Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 110-120. Danner and Martinez separate World War II-era jurisprudence
into three categories: "common plan liability" or "common design liability," conspiracy, and criminal organizational
liability.
26
HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 46 (1999).
27
RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 8-9 (1971). Great Britain was even
calling for summary executions as late as April 1945. In a letter sent to FDR on April 23, 1945, a British aide wrote,
"[His Majesty's Government is] deeply impressed with the dangers and difficulties of this course [judicial
proceedings], and they think that execution without trial is the preferable course. [A trial] would be exceedingly
long and elaborate, [many of the Nazis' deeds] are not war crimes in the ordinary sense, nor is it at all clear that they
can properly be described as crimes under international law."
28
BALL, supra note 26, at 45.
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critical to the machinery of death and destruction. 29 The first issue raised new legal concerns
because war crimes, by traditional definition, could only occur during a time of war and could
only be perpetrated upon another States' citizenry. The world had just witnessed large-scale
carnage, but they had been directed by a State against its own people, and they had occurred
before the outset of war—realms of behavior outside traditional humanitarian law at the time.
This is discussed in further detail below in section three relating to crimes against humanity. For
the second issue, Bernays looked to Anglo-American conspiracy law, noting precedents such as
the Smith Act of 1938 in the U.S. and the British India Act of 1836. 30 Bernays drew up his
proposal within a few weeks, commonly referred to as "Bernays' Plan," and Roosevelt submitted
it to Churchill and Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. 31
Under Bernays' Plan, organizations would be charged and tried at the Nuremberg
Tribunal alongside the two dozen individual defendants. The judges would determine whether
the organizations engaged in criminal behavior and should be designated as a criminal
organization. Once an organization was deemed criminal, subsequent military trials would be
held for individual defendants where they would have to defend against their membership in the
organization. Judges would only have to determine whether the accused joined the organization
voluntarily, and defendants would be unable to assert their ignorance as to the organization's
criminal purpose. The plan was meant to facilitate convictions and deal with an extremely large
number of people involved in criminal activity. 32

29

Id. at 46.
Id.
31
Id. at 48. The British disapproved of the plan and still sought summary executions. Churchill had even called for
summary executions as late as April 1945.
32
Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 113 (citing Stanislaw Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organizations, in
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 216 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990)).
30
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With Bernays' Plan on the table, the Allies met in 1945 in London to discuss postwar
justice. The concept of conspiracy figured prominently at the conference and provoked heated
debates about the substantive and procedural law to be applied to those on the losing side of the
war. American lawyers sought the inclusion of conspiracy as a means of attaching liability to
individuals where the relationship between them and the crimes was tenuous at best. Because
their underlings carried out the orders, most civilian leaders did not have "direct" involvement in
the commission of atrocities. The Americans took the lead in establishing the strike zones that
the Tribunal would later use. Some delegations apparently first picked their targets, and next
worked out the legal principles that would snare the greatest number of high ranking and
prominent alleged criminals. 33 Conspiratorial liability allowed them to cast a wide net.
On the other side of the table, the French and Soviet delegations distrusted conspiracy
law and expressed strong criticisms about its use. According to one account of the conspiracy
debates at the London Conference:
[T]he Russians and French seemed unable to grasp all the implications of the concept; when they finally
did grasp it, they were genuinely shocked. The French viewed it entirely as a barbarous legal mechanism
unworthy of modern law, while the Soviets seemed to have shaken their head in wonderment--a reaction,
some cynics may believe, prompted by envy. 34

But despite French and Soviet reservations, they eventually conceded and the Allies incorporated
conspiracy law into the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major
War Criminals of the European Theater, setting forth the authority of an international tribunal to
prosecute those most responsible for the horrific crimes committed in Europe. 35

33

See MINEAR, supra note 27, at 37. One chief British representative at the London Conference stated: "What is in
my mind is getting a man like Ribbentrop or Ley. It would be a great pity if we failed to get Ribbentrop or Ley or
Streicher. Now I want words that will leave no doubt that men who have originated the plan or taken part in the
early stages of the plan are going to be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."
34
Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 115 (citing Pomorski, supra note 32, at 216-17 (citation omitted)).
35
Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter provides: "Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in
the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan." Professor Cherif Bassiouni notes that "[o]n its
face, such a formulation derives from the common law and does not have much in common with the Romanist-
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At Nuremberg conspiracy law played a role both as a substantive crime (conspiracy to
commit crimes against peace) and as a means of liability, in that one could be convicted of
others' acts that were within the execution of a common plan or conspiracy. 36 The first count
against the individual defendants, as well as the seven organizations, expressly reflected the
concept of conspiracy as a substantive crime, which was titled "Count One – The Common Plan
or Conspiracy." 37 The indictment alleged, in summation, that all were guilty of:
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit
Crimes against Humanity in the course of preparation for war and in the course of prosecution of war; and
of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only against the armed forces of their enemies but also against
non-belligerent civilian populations… 38

Following the language of the Charter, the indictment further alleged that the defendants had
"participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution"
of the common plan or conspiracy, and that they were each responsible "for their own acts and
for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy." 39 During the
judgment deliberations, the British and Soviet judges accepted the validity of conspiracy as a
sound legal doctrine along the lines of those set forth by the American prosecutors.
French judge Donnedieu de Vabres disagreed and argued the case against the use of
conspiracy law. 40 He, along with his French alternate, wanted all of Count One thrown out. 41
They believed that the substantive crime absorbed the conspiracy, rendering the charge
unnecessary. 42 An American judge, Francis Biddle, even sympathized with the French because

Civilist-Germanic systems." CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
382 (1999).
36
Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 116.
37
Counts 2, 3, and 4 were, respectively, "Crimes Against Peace," "War Crimes," and "Crimes Against Humanity."
38
International Military Tribunal, Indictment, Oct. 6, 1945, reprinted in THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL:
1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 64 (Michael R. Marrus ed., 1997).
39
Id., reprinted in THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 58 (Michael R.
Marrus ed., 1997).
40
THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 231 (Michael R. Marrus ed., 1997).
41
Id.
42
Id.
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of his own experiences with overly broad conspiracy charges in the U.S. 43 But Biddle's
reservations were quite different than those of the French. Where the French disagreed with the
concept in general, Biddle disagreed with its potentially abusive application, in that too many
Germans might be collared if the organizations were found guilty of conspiracy. 44 The judges
ultimately compromised and determined that the conspiracy charge was limited to the conspiracy
to plan and wage aggressive war, but they dropped the charges of conspiracy in Count One
relating to the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 45 The Tribunal ruled that
Article 6 of the Charter did not define, and therefore could not support, the crimes of conspiracy
to commit war crimes and conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity, unlike the crime of
conspiracy to commit crimes against peace that was expressly provided for in Article 6(a). 46 The
Tribunal subsequently concluded that the common planning to prepare and wage aggressive war
had been established.
Although not as significant as the prosecution would have liked, conspiracy as a means of
attributing liability also played a role in the proceedings at Nuremberg. At the time, coconspirator liability was well-known in common law jurisdictions, but no civil law country had
embraced the doctrine. 47 Apart from of the doctrine's level of acceptance around the world, it
has been argued that co-conspirator liability was effectively discounted at the Tribunal, as
evidenced by the fact that those convicted of conspiracy to commit aggressive war were either
those who had directly participated in the planning or those who were among Hitler's most senior
43

Id. at 231-32.
Id. at 232.
45
Id.
46
Article 6 listed three crimes: (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; and (c) crimes against humanity. Marrus
notes that the charge of "crimes against peace" was the central concept and is critical to understanding the
framework of the indictment; it was the conspiracy to commit crimes against peace that ultimately led to the other
crimes—i.e., crimes against humanity and war crimes. Because of the overlapping nature of the crimes, the
prosecution had a difficult time separating the first two counts. Id. at 122.
47
Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 115, (citing Edward M. Wise, RICO and Its Analogues: Some Comparative
Considerations, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 303, 312 (2000)).
44

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 43

leadership. 48 It has also been pointed out that the judgment did not mention conspiracy (or
common plan liability) in its discussion of those found guilty of crimes against humanity or war
crimes. 49 This finding is significant because JCE liability, as discussed below, is solely a vehicle
for imputing liability; it is not a substantive crime in itself.
Regarding criminal organizational liability, under Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter, 50 the
prosecution charged seven organizations with being "criminal organizations": Nazi Party
leadership; Reich cabinet; Nazi government ministers; SS; Gestapo; SD; Sturmabteilung (SA);
storm troopers; and the military high command, which comprised Germany's army, navy and air
force commanders-in-chief. The Tribunal ruled that three findings must be established before
holding an organization to be criminal: first, a majority of the organization's members must have
been volunteers; second, the organization's public activities must have included one of the crimes
falling within Article 6 of the Charter; and third, a majority of the members must have been
knowledgeable or conscious of the organization's criminal activities or purpose. 51 Using this
framework, four of the groups (Nazi Party leadership, Gestapo, SS, SD) were found to be
criminal.
The next step in Bernays' Plan--the adjudication of individuals--never materialized. The
judges at Nuremberg tweaked Bernays' Plan and shifted the burden, in that the prosecution had
to prove that the accused not only joined voluntarily but also had knowledge of the organization's
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Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 116.
Id. at 116-17.
50
Article 9 of the Charter provided that "the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the
individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal
organization." Article 10 of the Charter provided: "In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by
the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group
or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned." In order to be found guilty, the individual must
have joined voluntarily, must have joined intentionally, and must have known that the organization was criminal.
51
BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 385.
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criminal purpose. 52 This burden-shifting resulted in the lack of widespread summary trials for
membership in criminal organizations. The mass justice envisioned by Bernays was largely
replaced with an administration de-Nazification program. 53
The link between prosecuting organizations at Nuremberg and conspiracy law is found in
Chief of Counsel Robert H. Jackson's opening statement on the criminality of organizations,
when he stated that "proceedings against organizations are closely akin to the conspiracy
charge." 54 To illustrate the legitimacy of the process Jackson discussed conspiracy liability laws
on the books in several countries. 55 He broadly concluded that "[o]rganizations with criminal
ends are everywhere regarded as in the nature of criminal conspiracies and their criminality is
judged by the application of conspiracy principles." 56 Jackson noted, however, that organization
liability, although grounded heavily in conspiracy law, was not the exclusive product of national
conspiracy law. Looking to the language of the Charter, Jackson argued that it did not refer
solely to "conspiracy," 57 thus hedging his bets if conspiracy law fell out of favor with the judges.
The judges considered the similarities between a conspiracy and a criminal organization
in that for the latter to exist, "there must be a group bound together and organized for a common
52

Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 114 (citations omitted).
Id.
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ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE LAW UNDER WHICH NAZI ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACCUSED OF BEING CRIMINAL,
ARGUMENT BY ROBERT H. JACKSON, FEBRUARY 28, 1946, reprinted in, THE NURNBERG CASE: AS PRESENTED BY
ROBERT H. JACKSON, at 104 (1971). But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 382-83 (arguing that Jackson fell victim
to the confusion between conspiracy and membership in criminal organization liability, in that Article 6(a) of the
Charter linked conspiracy to "crimes against peace," and that the Nuremberg Tribunal did not rely on Article 6(a) for
"crimes against humanity").
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JACKSON, supra note 54, at 106-07. Jackson stated: "The German courts in dealing with criminal organizations
proceeded on the theory that all members were held together by a common plan in which each one participated even
though at various levels. Moreover, the fundamental principles of responsibility of members, as stated by the
German Supreme Court, are strikingly like the principles that govern the Anglo-American law of conspiracy."
56
Id. at 107.
57
Id. at 108. Jackson recounted how he had urged the court: "The Charter did not define responsibility for the acts
of others in terms of 'conspiracy' alone. The crimes were defined in nontechnical but inclusive terms, and embraced
formulating and executing a 'common plan' as well as participating in a 'conspiracy.' It was feared that to do
otherwise might import into the proceedings technical requirements and limitations which have grown up around the
term 'conspiracy.' There are some divergences between the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy and that of
either Soviet, French, or German jurisprudence. It was desired that concrete cases be guided by the broader
considerations inherent in the nature of the social problem, rather than controlled by refinements of any local law."
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purpose. The group must be formed or used in connection with the commission of crimes
denounced by the Charter." 58 The apparent linkage between conspiracy law and membership
liability, however, did nothing to assuage later critics of the latter form of liability. Renowned
international criminal law professor M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that the notion of group or
collective responsibility had no basis in international law at that time, thus violating the principle
of legality. 59 Even though reservations abounded in Nuremberg and there have been strong
criticisms since, however, the means of vicarious liability used at Nuremberg did add greatly to
the development of individual criminal responsibility in international law.

B. The Tokyo Tribunal
Often overlooked due to Nuremberg's long shadow, the Tokyo Tribunal also contributed
to the development of international criminal law. Set up to try Japanese war criminals for
alleged crimes committed from the early 1930's to 1945, the Tokyo Tribunal lasted two and a
half years, including the seven months taken by the judges in reaching a verdict, and resulted in a
49,000-page transcript and 1,218-page judgment. 60 The indictment charged twenty-eight
individuals--nine civilians and nineteen professionals. In contrast, of the twenty-two defendants
at Nuremberg, seventeen were civilians. 61 Along with the several dozen counts of crimes against
peace, there were counts of murder, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 62 The core of the
case revolved around the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, in contravention to several
international agreements.
58
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As in Nuremberg, conspiracy law played a central role in the proceedings in Tokyo. In
his opening statement, Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan, a former U.S. Attorney that had
written the Lindberg kidnapping law and led the gang-busting division at the Department of
Justice, wanted to define conspiracy in terms of U.S. practice. 63 He defended his proposal by
stating, "This offense is known to and well recognized by most civilized nations, and the gist of
it is so similar in all countries that the definition of it by a Federal court of the United States may
well be accepted as an adequate expression of the common conception of this offense." 64 One
American supporter even argued that the proposed application was "modest" in comparison to
Soviet and Anglo-Saxon law, and that it was more in accordance with French, German, Chinese,
and Japanese notions of conspiracy law. 65
The defense immediately attacked the conspiracy charge as dubious. In its own opening
statement, the defense argued that conspiracy had no longstanding tradition and was "unique in
the Anglo-American legal system …[and] cannot be deemed to constitute international law." 66
Lead defense counsel Takayanagi Kenzo argued that it was "a peculiar product of English legal
history," citing several Western legal scholars in support of his viewpoint. 67 One of the
commentators Kenzo cited had written that it was "a doctrine as anomalous and provincial as it is
unhappy in its results. It is unknown to the Roman law; it is not found in modern Continental
codes; few Continental lawyers ever heard of it." 68 After hearing arguments from both sides,
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MINEAR, supra note 27, at 40. The prosecution team was made up of eleven Allied nations, each nation
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Keenan, an American.
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Id. at 41 (quoting TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS 8-9, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Publication 2613 (1946)). The
case Keenan is referring to is Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1937).
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BRACKMAN, supra note 60, at 85. Brendan F. Brown, the dean of law at Catholic University, expressed this
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Id. at 284.
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however, the court ruled that conspiracy was indeed a crime under international law and
continued the proceedings. 69
In language similar to the Nuremberg indictment, Count One of the Tokyo indictment
alleged participation as "leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy …[to] wage wars of aggression, and war or wars in
violation of international law." 70 This count proved extremely successful, as all except two of
the defendants were found guilty. 71 Interestingly, two of the defendants found guilty of
conspiracy to wage wars of aggression were found guilty of nothing else. 72 With respect to the
other counts in the indictment, the court threw out all but ten of the forty-five counts, 73 and of
those ten, only two did not relate to the waging of war. 74 Thus, the waging of war, rather than
other crimes, figured most prominently in Tokyo.
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Judge Pal of India dissented and stated: "After giving my anxious thought to the question I have come to the
conclusion that 'conspiracy' by itself is not yet a crime in international law." President Webb of Australia agreed,
who said that international law "does not expressly include a crime of naked conspiracy," and that the Tokyo
Tribunal "has no authority to create a crime of naked conspiracy based on the Anglo-American concept." Id. at 42.
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disrupts it. The probable result of such a conspiracy, and the inevitable result of its execution, is that death and
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there was a conspiracy to wage wars in violation of the treaties, agreements and assurances specified in the
particulars annexed to Count 1. The conspiracy to wage wars of aggression was already criminal in the highest
degree. The tribunal finds that the existence of the criminal conspiracy to wage wars of aggression … has been
proved." Id. at 414.
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MINEAR, supra note 27, at 42.
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BRACKMAN, supra note 60, at 379. The dismissed counts were thrown out due to lack of jurisdiction, or because
the count was redundant, had merged with another count, or was obscurely stated. Id. at 373.
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Id. at 380. Those two counts were 54 and 55. Under Count 54, the Tribunal found five defendants guilty of
having "ordered, authorized, and permitted" inhumane treatment of POWs and others. Under Count 55, the court
found seven defendants guilty of having "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their duty" to take appropriate and
adequate steps to prevent atrocities from occurring.
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The Tokyo Tribunal reinforced the concept of conspiracy within international criminal
law but did little to clarify or modify the appropriateness of its use. The judges felt somewhat
constrained in their discretion, and they looked heavily towards the proceedings simultaneously
underway in Nuremberg. In one instance, when the prosecution began to present its case in
relation to Japan's preparations for war in the Pacific and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the opening
statement referred to a document from 1934. One of the judges interrupted and stated:
We have just received [the Nuremberg judgment], and the court there stresses the point that evidence of a
conspiracy should not go too far back; it should be comparatively recent. … When you consider the
Nuremberg judgment you may decide to cut down some of the material you intend to put before the
court. 75

Clearly, decisions made at Nuremberg affected the substance and procedure administered in
Tokyo.
One historian of the Tokyo Tribunal stated that it actually suffered from the wake of Nazi
atrocities and the Nuremberg Tribunal. Richard H. Minear, in a respected account of the trial,
argued that the charges of conspiracy in Tokyo were the result of overzealous prosecutors
blindingly applying the unique context of Nazi Germany to Imperial Japan. He stated that Tojo
was not Hitler, there was no Nazi Party, the Japanese constitution and government was fully
functioning, the leaders did not usurp any power, and the context of the Pacific War was totally
different from the European theater. 76 Those differences may be notable, but in spite of whether
it was prudent for the judges to apply conspiracy law to the Japanese context, they clearly found
conspiracy law to be firmly grounded in international law.
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Id. at 226.
MINEAR, supra note 27, at 127-134.
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C. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
In 1998, the Trial Chamber in Delalic and Delic at the ICTY referred to a "common
criminal purpose." 77 The Trial Chamber did not elaborate on the concept, but the brief mention
opened the floodgates to a doctrine the ICTY would later call "joint criminal enterprise." Less
than one year later, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic employed similar language and provided teeth
to the doctrine. 78
The first full-length trial at the ICTY ended with mixed results. Supporters pointed to
Dusko Tadic's conviction in 1997 as a victory for human rights and the enforcement of
individual criminal responsibility within international law. Not since Nuremberg and its
immediate progeny had an individual been subject to an international criminal tribunal. The
Tribunal found Tadic guilty on several counts, but he was also acquitted on several others.
Despite their disappointment, human rights and post-conflict justice advocates could point to the
acquittals as legitimizing the tribunal; it could not simply be dismissed as a case of victors'
justice. Had the process been a mere show trial, Tadic would have been found guilty on all
counts. The Appeals Chamber later reversed some of the acquittals, and in the process generated
a heated debate regarding the proper limits of individual criminal responsibility within
international law.
Dusko Tadic, like many other Yugoslavians before the breakup of the country, lived in a
multi-ethnic community. As the owner of a local café and former karate instructor, the ethnic
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Prosecutor v. Delalic and Delic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 328, Case No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998)
(holding that where there is a pre-existing plan to commit crimes "or where there otherwise is evidence that
members of a group are acting with a common criminal purpose, all those who knowingly participate in, and directly
and substantially contribute to, the realisation of this purpose may be held criminal responsible under Article 7(1)
for the resulting criminal conduct"). See also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶¶ 211-13,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998); Schabas, supra note 20, at 1031 (observing that the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise stems from the Delalic court's discussion of complicity).
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter, Tadic,
Appeals Judgment].
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Serb interacted with Muslims on a regular basis prior to the unrest of the early 1990's. During
the time when Milosevic and Belgrade began to incite ethnic nationalism among their Serbian
population, Tadic rose to become a local party leader of the Serbian Democratic Society in the
Prijedor municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a member of the paramilitary forces, he
helped Serbian and Bosnian Serb forces take over the region. Tadic later facilitated the
expulsion and "resettlement" of the entire non-Serb population in his area. His intimate
knowledge of the community allowed him to pick out Muslim leaders, as well as other prominent
local leaders, deemed detrimental to Serbian policies. Such individuals were severely mistreated
after being identified. During the conflict many civilians were beaten, robbed and killed, and
many others were taken to the detention camps of Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje.
The Trial Chamber convicted Tadic on several counts of crimes against humanity and
war crimes and he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. It was the Trial Chamber's
acquittal on one charge, though, that eventually led to the development of JCE liability. The
prosecution charged Tadic with the murder of five Muslim men in the Bosnian village of Jaskici.
The Trial Chamber had determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Tadic was in fact a member
of an armed group that entered Jaskici, that the group searched the village for Muslim men, and
that the five Muslim men who were found shot to death after the group left the village had all
been alive when the group first entered the village. 79 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber noted that
it "cannot, on the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had
any part in the killing of the five men." 80 Notably, the Trial Chamber did, however, find that the
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murders temporally occurred after Serbian forces entered the village and engaged in ethnic
cleansing in a nearby village. 81
The prosecution appealed this point and the Appeals Chamber reversed, holding that "the
only reasonable conclusion the Trial Chamber could have drawn is that the armed group to
which [Tadic] belonged killed the five men." 82 According to the Appeals Chamber's review of
the Trial Chamber's findings, Tadic had, "with other armed men, participated in the removal of
men, who had been separated from women and children, from the village of Sivici to the
Keraterm camp, and also participated in the calling-out of residents, the separation of men from
women and children, and the beating and taking away of men in the village of Jaskici" where
"five men were killed." 83 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that the Trial Chamber's findings of
such evidence were sufficient to attach liability. Direct evidence linking Tadic to the murders
did not exist, yet the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber and found that Tadic had
acted pursuant to a common criminal design and was liable under Article 7(1) of the ICTY
Statute. 84 Specifically, Tadic intended to further the criminal purpose "to rid the Prijedor region
of the non-Serb population, by committing inhuman acts against them," and he was aware that it
was foreseeable, and knowingly took the risk, that the group would kill non-Serbs in effecting
this criminal aim. 85 This holding became the foundation for the modern doctrine of JCE.
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In finding liability the Appeals Chamber discussed whether participation in a JCE even
falls within the language of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. 86 The court first confirmed the
doctrine's legitimacy and then noted that Article 7(1) covers not only direct physical perpetration
of the crime, but also that "commission of one of the crimes envisaged in Articles 2, 3, 4, or 5 of
the Statute might also occur though participation in the realisation of a common design or
purpose." 87 This position has been affirmed by the Appeals Chamber in later decisions.88
Specifically, the court determined that participation in a JCE is a form of "commission" within
the ambit of Article 7(1).
Seeking to preempt the doctrine's critics, the Appeals Chamber stated that liability
stemming from participation in a JCE is not tantamount to guilt by association. A "guilt by
association" charge would fuel critics and de-legitimize a principle it was embracing, and the
court wished to attack those charges head-on. The Appeals Chamber referred to the 1993 Report
of the U.N. Secretary-General on Security Council Resolution 808, which had rejected outright
the notion of guilt by association in stating that the Tribunal should not have jurisdiction over
persons simply based on their membership in a particular organization. 89 The court reaffirmed
the principle of personal culpability, holding that "nobody may be held criminally responsible for
acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated." 90
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See supra note 84.
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The Appeals Chamber then laid the general framework for JCE liability, which has been
consistently followed ever since. There are three categories of JCE, and each one must satisfy
three requirements: 1) a plurality of persons; 2) the existence of a common plan, design or
purpose that involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute; and 3) the
participation of the accused in the common plan involving the perpetration of the crime provided
for in the Statute. 91 These three objective elements comprise the actus reus for all three
categories. The mens rea, in contrast, is different for each category. 92
The first category of JCE involves the situation in which all the co-participants share the
same criminal intent, e.g., where all the co-perpetrators formulate a plan to kill a particular
individual. Although only one member of the group may physically commit the act, the others
are no less responsible for the killing as a result of their shared intent. To be liable for others'
acts the individual must have voluntarily participated in one aspect of the common design and
must have intended the result. 93
The second category is a variant of the first category, growing out of the so-called
"concentration camp" cases. 94 In these cases, the actus reus is "the active participation in the
enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the position of authority and
the specific functions held by each accused," and the mens rea comprises "(i) knowledge of the
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nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further the common concerted design to ill-treat
inmates." 95
The third category, sometimes referred to as the "extended" category, under which the
Appeals Chamber convicted Tadic of the Jaskici murders, concerns cases involving "a common
design to pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act which,
while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
effecting of that common purpose." 96 The now-classic example, as provided by the Appeals
Chamber, is the shared intention by a group of individuals to remove forcibly an ethnic group
from their village, which during the process a victim is shot and killed.97 In such a case, "[w]hile
murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common design, it was
nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result in the
deaths of one or more of those civilians." 98 In other words, "[c]riminal responsibility may be
imputed to all participants within the common enterprise where the risk of death occurring was
both a predictable consequence of the execution of the common design and the accused was
either reckless or indifferent." 99 The Appeals Chamber supported this category with case law
from World War II-era national military courts dealing with, inter alia, mob violence. These
cases are cited as evidence of what some refer to as common plan or common design liability. 100
The Appeals Chamber asserted that JCE liability is present in many national legal
systems and is grounded in customary international law. Several commentators avowedly
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disagree with that proposition, 101 especially with respect to the third category. Steven Powles
argues that third-category JCE, upon closer inspection, is not uniformly practiced. 102 Powles
attacks the Appeals Chamber's use of the Essen Lynching 103 and Borkum Island 104 cases, stating
that they do not stand for the propositions cited by the Tribunal in Tadic. In the Essen Lynching
case, a crowd of German civilians participated in the group-beating and killing of three British
prisoners of war while they were under the escort of a German soldier. Determining who dealt
the final death blows to the victims was not practically feasible. Before a British military court,
the prosecution argued that if the attackers had the intent to kill the prisoners, then they were
guilty of murder; if they had no such intent, then they could still be found guilty of
manslaughter. 105 Powles suggests that the murder convictions only illustrate the fact that the
court found the attackers to have intended to kill the airmen, not, as the Appeals Chamber in
Tadic suggests, that the defendants were found guilty based solely on the fact that they had
knowledge that others' lethal acts were foreseeable yet continued their participation. 106
Powles similarly finds little support for third-category JCE in the Borkum Island case. 107
After being shot down in the German town of Borkum, seven American prisoners were forced to
march through the streets while being subjected to mob violence by the local civilians. 108
German officials and soldiers facilitated and participated in beating and firing at the men,
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resulting in their deaths. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic considered the prosecution's opening
statement in Borkum Island and determined that it had espoused a form of common design
liability, namely, first-category JCE whereby each individual shared the same intent to commit
the crime. 109 The Appeals Chamber then took great liberty and "presumed" that because all of
the accused had been found guilty pursuant to a criminal common design to assault the POWs,
and because some of those accused had also been found guilty of murder, then "[p]resumably,
this was on the basis that the accused, whether by virtue of their status, role or conduct, were in a
position to have predicted that the assault would lead to the killing of the victims by some of
those participating in the assault." 110 Citing this case strained credulity and did little in the way
of providing evidence that the expanded form of JCE has deep roots within international law.
Powles does agree, however, with the Appeals Chamber's interpretation of the postWorld War II Italian case D'Ottavio et al. 111 as support for the third category, but he notes that
one case alone, out of several cited, does not warrant the finding that this form of vicarious
liability is customary international law. 112 D'Ottavio et al. involved the shooting of an escaped
prisoner during the course of the crime of "illegal restraint," and because it was foreseeable that
one of the participants might shoot and kill the prisoner as a result of their common criminal
plan, all participants were found guilty of manslaughter. 113 The Appeals Chamber cited several
other Italian cases but none of them appear to conclusively support third-category JCE. 114
Professors Allison Danner and Jenny Martinez also argue that the World War II-era case
precedent cited by the Appeals Chamber does not support the extended form of JCE. Instead,
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they argue that more similarities may be drawn from two concepts present at Nuremberg, neither
of which was cited as support for third-category JCE: criminal organization prosecution and the
crime of conspiracy. 115 Both of these concepts are discussed above.
Other prominent commentators tend to pass over the legitimacy of third-category JCE-the category that certainly requires the most justification. For example, in his 2003 international
law textbook, former justice and president of the ICTY Antonio Cassese devotes less than a page
to criminal responsibility for non-agreed-upon yet foreseeable crimes of other participants in a
criminal plan, whereas he spends almost seven pages justifying individual responsibility for nondirect perpetrators that had intended the commission of the crime within a criminal plan. 116
Cassese reviews the cases mentioned by the Tadic Appeals Chamber concerning the first and
second category of JCE but passes over the cases supposedly supporting the third category.
The mens rea sufficient for liability under third-category JCE also stretches notions of
individual criminal responsibility. With respect to the first category, the accused must have
shared the intent to commit the crime actually committed. 117 If the accused had the intent to
commit the crime and participated in the commission of that crime, then culpability is easily
justifiable. With respect to second-category JCE, the accused must have had knowledge of the
system of repression in which he participates, and must have intended to further that common
design involving ill-treatment. 118 Again, the accused must have had the specific intent to
participate in specific criminal activity.
Third-category JCE differs greatly on the mens rea required to find liability. Under the
third category, the accused is responsible for crimes that go beyond the object of the JCE if he
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was: 1) aware that those non-agreed-upon crimes were a foreseeable consequence of the JCE;
and, 2) with that awareness, he willingly took the risk that that the additional crime may occur
and continued his participation in the criminal enterprise.119 The Trial Chamber in Brdjanin and
Talic 120 explained that the first element as to whether the crime was a natural and foreseeable
consequence is objective, whereas the second element as to the individual's awareness of that
natural and foreseeable consequence is subjective. That is, the accused need not have intended
the co-actor to have committed any further crime, and he need not have possessed the other
direct perpetrator's state of mind for that further crime in order to be found liable.
As seen from the Tribunal's expositions on the subject, the first and second categories
require an intent to perpetrate the crime, whereas the third category merely requires knowledge
that a certain crime is foreseeable, regardless of the mens rea of the accused concerning the
actual foreseeable crime. 121 Therefore, the first and second categories have a much stricter
standard and are more difficult to prove, whereas a participant may be found liable under thirdcategory JCE under a much lower culpable state of mind. In both situations, the non-direct
perpetrator is liable. If the prosecution wishes to prove liability under first-category JCE, it
needs to establish the participant's specific intent to commit the agreed-upon criminal act that
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was subsequently committed. Proving intent is generally difficult, not considering the system
employed. Conversely, if the prosecution wishes to pursue liability under third-category JCE, it
only needs to prove that the act committed was foreseeable based on the participant's intent to
further the original criminal purpose (setting aside for a moment the "willingness" aspect of mens
rea). This leads to an objective standard—a much easier and evidence-friendly means of
proving "intent." Taking this distinction into consideration, it is surprising that the prosecution
ever pursues a defendant under first-category JCE rather than the wildly more encompassing
third-category JCE.
Upon inspection, the requisite mens rea for third-category JCE seems awfully similar to a
standard of negligence—a standard of guilt generally considered inappropriate for serious crimes
carrying lengthy prison sentences. 122 Objective criteria, such as foreseeability, are accepted in
negligence-based crimes, but those crimes do not carry the stiffest criminal penalties. Such
crimes are "a form of anti-social behaviour judged by a different yardstick" than those committed
with malice and premeditation. 123 Professor William Schabas argues that JCE, and command
responsibility for that matter, "establish an objective rather than a subjective standard for the
assessment of mens rea [in that the] … Tribunal can remain uncertain about what the offender
actually believed, intended and knew, as long as it is satisfied with how a reasonable person in
the same circumstances would have judged the situation and reacted." 124 Schabas is correct to a
certain extent but he does not address the "willingness" aspect of third-category JCE espoused in
later jurisprudence of the ICTY. The crime must not only have been a natural and foreseeable
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consequence—a strictly objective element—but the accused must also have known of the
foreseeable consequence and nevertheless "willingly" taken the risk. 125 Even with the inclusion
of the "willingness" sub-element, however, the mental element still remains largely objective. If
the prosecution successfully argues that a crime is a foreseeable consequence of a stated common
plan, then the accused's actual state of mind will be difficult to rebut. In fact, even if the
individual knew of the foreseeable crime and took steps to avoid such consequences, that
individual would nevertheless be responsible for all acts committed within the scope of that
common enterprise. Thus, the apparent subjective inclusion into the requisite mental element
does little to protect against improper findings of personal culpability.

D. Joint Criminal Enterprise In Comparison to Vicarious Liability in the U.S.
JCE may sound familiar to lawyers trained in the U.S. Even foreign lawyers will
recognize some aspects of JCE liability because in certain municipal legal systems, one may be
found liable for another person's criminal acts. Two forms of vicarious liability in particular
allow for such attribution. Although often used synonymously, "conspiratorial liability" and
"accomplice liability" are distinct doctrines and should be considered separately. Examining
them as such reveals that JCE liability has characteristics of both.
Throughout its history conspiracy law has met with skepticism. Because of the great
potential to cast a wide net, conspiracy law has been referred to as the "darling of the modern
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prosecutor's nursery." 126 Even U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson once stated that
the "crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition" 127 and described it as a
"dragnet device capable of perversion into an instrument of injustice in the hands of a partisan or
complacent judiciary." 128 Yet Jackson concluded that it "has an established place in our system
of law …[and there is] no constitutional authority for taking this weapon from the
Government." 129 Interestingly, these comments came only half a decade after leading the U.S.
prosecution team in Nuremberg.
Conspiracy law involves two separate, but interrelated, key concepts: conspiracy as an
inchoate offense and conspiracy as a complicity doctrine. 130 Regarding the criminal offense, in
U.S. state common law a conspiracy is "an agreement by two or more persons to commit a
criminal act or series of criminal acts, or to accomplish a legal act by unlawful means." 131 An
accused may be guilty of a conspiracy itself; the commission of an underlying act is not required.
Unlike conspiracy, a JCE, standing alone, is not a crime per se. JCE is only a complicity
doctrine.
Critics of conspiracy as a crime in itself decry its inchoate nature, and they argue that
such a crime defies expectations of criminal justice. The fact that an individual may be found
guilty of conspiracy despite not having committed an act in perpetration of any crime is hard for
126
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many to accept. Mere agreement by two or more persons to commit a crime, with no further
positive act required, including the partial or full commission of the crime, is enough to find guilt
of conspiracy in some jurisdictions. Conspiracy law, therefore, primarily focuses on the mens
rea rather than the physical perpetration of any underlying crime. 132 Because of this emphasis,
one commentator has commented on the risk that "persons will be punished for what they say
rather than for what they do, or [simply] for associating with others who are found culpable." 133
The ICTY Appeals Chamber addressed the relationship between conspiracy and JCE,
stating that the latter requires not only a meeting of the minds but also positive action in
furtherance of the common plan. 134 To support this, the Tribunal quoted the U.N. War Crimes
Commission, which stated, "the difference between a charge of conspiracy and one of acting in
pursuant [sic] of a common design is that the first would claim that an agreement to commit
offences had been made while the second would allege not only the making of an agreement but
the performance of acts pursuant to it." 135 The Appeals Chamber also distinguished JCE from
liability arising from membership in an organization. 136 Unlike the Nuremberg Charter,
organizational liability did not fall within the Statute of the ICTY. 137
Comparing JCE liability to the crime of conspiracy raises interesting similarities and
distinctions. A conspiracy, as in JCE liability, requires two or more persons. Likewise, those
persons must possess all required intents. For example, if three persons intend to agree, but only
two of them intend to commit the underlying offense, then that third person is not guilty of a
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conspiracy even though the other two are guilty. Also similar to JCE, an express agreement
amongst the parties is not required for there to be a conspiracy. 138 The agreement may be
inferred and may arise extemporaneously.
Furthermore, common law conspiracy is a specific intent crime, as is the case with
persecution and genocide. Conspiracy requires from two or more persons: 1) the intent to agree;
and, 2) the intent that the object of their agreement be completed. 139 Unless at least two persons
possess these two specific intents, no conspiracy exists. 140 Conspiracy's specific-intent nature
oftentimes results in a higher culpability for the crime of conspiracy as compared to the object of
the conspiracy. For example, if two individuals agree to burn a house and an occupant dies in
the process, they may be found guilty of conspiracy to commit arson, the underlying crime of
arson, and the crime of murder (based on reckless indifference to human life), but they are not
guilty of conspiracy to commit murder unless that was an object of their agreement. 141 Although
U.S. state common law splits on the question of whether conspiracy liability (i.e., liability for the
crime of conspiracy) requires a higher level of culpability for attendant circumstances above that
of what is required for the substantive offense of the criminal purpose,142 the Model Penal Code
favors a higher culpability requirement.
As stated before, the Tribunal has held that there is no distinct crime of JCE, and
therefore, conspiracy as a substantive stand-alone inchoate offense is not directly applicable to
ICTY jurisprudence on JCE. JCE is solely a means of attaching liability, and thus, it is
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conspiratorial liability (i.e., vicarious liability for the acts of a co-conspirator) that is most similar
to JCE liability and most relevant for the purposes of this discussion.
Conspiratorial liability is best understood when examining it alongside the doctrine of
accomplice liability. Teasing out the distinctions is important to understanding when a defendant
might be vicariously responsible for acts committed by others not intended by the defendant.
Conspiratorial liability is potentially broader, and more encompassing, than accomplice
liability. 143 One commentator distinguishes the two in the following manner: "an agreement
between two or more persons to participate in the commission of a crime is the key to a
conspiracy and, therefore, to conspiratorial liability. Actual assistance in the crime is not
required. Accomplice liability requires proof that an actor at least indirectly participated
(assisted) in the crime; an agreement to do so is not needed." 144 This distinction demonstrates
that it is possible for one to be a conspirator without being an accomplice, 145 and one can be
liable as an accomplice without being a conspirator.
In laying the foundation for JCE, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic referred to "the notion of
common design as a form of accomplice liability." 146 The Appeals Chamber refrained from
further discussion, and it does not appear that the court considered the distinction between
accomplice liability and conspiratorial liability. Nevertheless, based on this distinction above,
JCE appears to be a hybrid resembling both accomplice liability and conspiratorial liability.
Similar to accomplice liability, JCE liability requires participation in a common plan involving a
criminal offense. Similar to conspiratorial liability, JCE liability requires the existence of a

143

Id. at 487.
Id.
145
See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946).
146
Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 220. The Appeals Chamber stated that "the notion of common design as a form of
accomplice liability is firmly established in customary international law and in addition is upheld, albeit impliedly,
in the Statute of the International Tribunal."
144

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 65

common plan—i.e., a meeting of the minds. Thus, JCE appears to merge two theories of liability
found within U.S. state common law.
Another example helps demonstrate this distinction. Consider a Serb happening upon a
group of Bosnian Serbs beating a Bosnian Muslim at night. The Serb realizes what is
transpiring, and, unbeknownst to the group, turns on the lights with the intention that the beating
be more productive. Under U.S. common law, even though he did not throw a punch, the Serb
might be found guilty of battery under accomplice liability because he participated in and
facilitated the criminal act. He would not be guilty, however, under a conspiratorial liability
theory because there was no meeting of the minds between his and the group's. If the Serb had
earlier met the group at a café, and indicated that he would turn on the lights at a specific
moment to initiate the beating, but later reneged on this act, he would still be guilty of battery
through conspiratorial liability because he had conspired to commit battery and his coconspirators carried out the plan. He would also be guilty of conspiracy because actual positive
assistance is not required. Neither of these two examples, however, would result in JCE liability.
The different legal phrases associated with these separate theories of liability further
clarify the distinction. Under an accomplice liability theory, an individual is generally liable for
the "natural and probable consequences" of his intentional assistance in a given crime.
Therefore, a natural and probable consequence of participation in an armed robbery would be the
shooting and killing of a bank teller. Even if the individual indicated to his partner-in-crime that
he, under no circumstances, wanted anyone to die, he is still liable. When considering
conspiratorial liability, U.S. common law generally looks to whether the non-agreed-upon crime
was a "reasonably foreseeable" act in furtherance of the conspiracy. This rule of vicarious
liability, espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, holds that a

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 66

conspirator may be held liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of a co-conspirator committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy. 147 The critical component of this analysis is the starting point:
how broadly does the prosecution define the conspiracy? If the conspiracy is broadly defined,
then many acts will be foreseeable consequences of the plan, but if the conspiracy is limited in
scope, not much will be considered foreseeable as a result of the original conspiratorial plan.
Several U.S. states and federal law follow Pinkerton liability, but several other jurisdictions and
the Model Penal Code have rejected the approach. 148

III.

The Development of the Crime of Persecution
A. The Foundation of Crimes Against Humanity
The phrase "crimes against humanity" is often credited to the Nuremberg Charter but

permutations are found much earlier in the century. Several international instruments that
regulated armed conflict, most notably the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, had already
prohibited certain acts that would comprise what were later known as crimes against
humanity. 149 For example, the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention addressed "the rule of
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience." 150 The 1907

147

Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-47 (established the rule of vicarious liability in conspiracy cases). See also United
States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 338 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a conspirator is liable for all the reasonably
foreseeable acts of a co-conspirator committed in furtherance of the conspiracy).
148
Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 115-16 (citing SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 693 (7th ed. 2001)).
149
BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 42; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV),
Oct. 18, 1907 (entered into force, Jan. 26, 1910); Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (Hague II), July 29, 1899 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900).
150
The Preamble states: "Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants
and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience." This has generally been referred to as the Marten's Clause, named after Russian diplomat Fyodor
Martens who drafted it. Later in the century, similar language was used in Protocol Additional to the Geneva

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 67

Preamble, along with the similarly-worded 1899 Preamble, may be considered the legal basis for
crimes against humanity. 151
Less than a decade later, on May 28, 1915, France, Great Britain, and Russia declared
that the Ottoman Empire had massacred the Armenian population in Turkey, constituting "crimes
against civilization and humanity" for which the perpetrators should be held responsible. 152 Had
it not been for the U.S.' apprehension of what legal content, or lack thereof, comprised crimes
against humanity, the Treaty of Versailles might have used such language. 153
The first positive formulation in international criminal law for crimes against humanity
arose from the London Conference in the summer of 1945. 154 As discussed above in section
two, the Allies met in London to hash out issues of postwar justice. They debated the
components of international law rather than what constituted German municipal law, which is
what was later considered for Control Council Law No. 10. 155 On August 8, 1945, the Allies
settled on the London Agreement, which provided the authority to set up the Nuremberg
Tribunal. Crimes against humanity, along with war crimes and crimes against peace, took center
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Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50-55 (1946).
Article II 1(c) of Law No. 10 read: "Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of
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stage. The judgment at the Tokyo Tribunal, on the other hand, gave little consideration to the
issue of persecution, or crimes against humanity for that matter. 156
The Nuremberg Charter listed three crimes falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction:
"crimes against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity." The Allies, notably the
American, British, and Soviet delegations, realized that many of the atrocious acts committed
during the war fell outside the parameters of the contemporary law of armed conflict, including
war crimes and crimes against peace, and thus, they agreed upon this third category of crimes.
The framers included "crimes against humanity" in the Charter to avoid a gross injustice that
would have resulted had they rigidly adhered to the classes of people protected under the
classical law of armed conflict. In other words, war crimes did not cover many of the victims of
Nazi Germany's Final Solution, as well as others who were targeted, because most were German
nationals or nationals of German allies. Moreover, war crimes could only occur during a time of
war. Crimes against humanity attempted to close that legal loophole. Article 6(c) of the Charter
defined "crimes against humanity" as: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated." 157
The U.N. War Crimes Commission highlighted several novel phrases in the definition
that made crimes against humanity particularly pertinent. 158 First, the crimes could be
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committed against "any civilian population," which necessarily includes a country's own citizens.
No longer would nationality be a procedural bar. Second, the crimes could be committed "before
or during the war" as opposed to only being committed during war. Third, crimes against
humanity may occur "whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated." The drafters were well-aware that many of the criminal acts committed by the
Nazis were not "criminal" under German law due to discriminatory laws passed under Hitler's
direction. These principles ensured that no Nazi atrocity would be barred from prosecution.
This arguably new category of crimes generated much discussion. The drafters at the
London Conference debated whether "crimes against humanity" could be supported under any of
the sources cited by the Permanent Court of International Justice: international conventions,
customary international law, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, or
writings and legal decisions by distinguished jurists. 159 After concluding in the affirmative, the
attendees then were faced with the more difficult task of determining the contents of the
crime. 160
Because of the crime's dubious and uncertain parameters, the drafters presumably were
heavily concerned with the principle of legality. Professor Bassiouni sheds light on the
formulaic process, stating that the drafters had to "stitch together different elements of preexisting law and to extrapolate therefrom new legal elements while satisfying the requirements
of the 'principles of legality.'" 161 The drafters determined that crimes against humanity "are
simply an extension of war crimes because the category of protected persons is the same in the
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two crimes, the difference being whether the violators were of the same or another
nationality." 162 Thus, crimes against humanity were originally grounded in international
humanitarian law and should be understood as such. Linking this new category of crimes with
the already well-established category of war crimes would, perhaps, allay potential problems
arising from the principle of legality. 163
But why was it not until 1945 before such crimes were covered under international law?
New laws are often mere responses to events never imaginable or problems previously dormant.
Bassiouni refers to the events from 1932-1945 as highly indicative of this principle, writing that
it was a "case where the facts went beyond what international law had posited" because "the law
seldom anticipates the unthinkable." 164 Prewar international law definitely did not cover events
such as the Holocaust, but the Nazis were far from being the first to perpetrate mass evil upon a
specific population. It was, however, the first time when several leading countries had the
political will and existing network to cooperate in pushing international law in such a direction.

B. Common Elements to Crimes Against Humanity
Since the Nuremberg Tribunal, crimes against humanity have become entrenched as a
legitimate and identifiable category of crimes. No longer do lawyers and scholars debate the
merits of the existence of such a category. Over the past sixty years, however, the individual
elements of these crimes proved elusive. ICTY jurisprudence has changed this considerably.
Article 5 of the Statute gives the Tribunal power to prosecute persons responsible for crimes
against humanity, and since its first trial, the Tribunal has added greatly to the development of
crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity now have a checklist of components, thus
162
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ensuring uniformity in application. Because of its tremendous influence on modern international
criminal law (and because of its wholehearted acceptance and widespread use of the doctrine of
JCE), the ICTY's decisions concerning crimes against humanity figures prominently in this
article, and thus, all definitions and stated elements are garnered from the ICTY.
There are four elements common to all crimes against humanity. First, there must be an
armed conflict, either international or internal in character. 165 Second, "the acts of an accused
must be part of a widespread or systematic attack." 166 Importantly, the attack need not be both
widespread and systematic; either is sufficient. "Widespread" is generally defined as "the largescale nature of the attack and the number of targeted persons," whereas "systematic" refers to
"the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random
occurrence." 167 It is the attack, not the individual criminal acts of the accused, that must be
widespread or systematic. 168 The acts of the accused need only be a part of the attack and a
"single or limited number of acts" may constitute a crime against humanity "unless those acts
may be said to be isolated or random." 169 For example, "[p]atterns of crimes, in the sense of the
non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis, are a common
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expression of such systematic occurrence." 170 An "attack is not limited to the use of armed
force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population." 171
An important distinction is that between an "attack" and an "armed conflict." According
to the Trial Chamber in Brdjanin, the two concepts are:
distinct and independent from each other. The attack could precede, outlast or continue during the armed
conflict, without necessarily being part of it. 172 To establish whether there was an attack, it is not relevant
that the other side also committed atrocities against its opponent's civilian population.173 Each attack
against the other side's civilian population would be equally illegitimate and crimes committed as part of
such attack could, all other conditions being met, amount to crimes against humanity. 174

The Trial Chamber further stated that the temporal and geographical relationship between the
crime and the attack need not be necessarily tight. The criminal acts "need to objectively 'form
part' of the attack by their nature or consequences, 175 as distinct from being committed in
isolation, but they do not need to be committed in the midst of the attack." 176 The Trial Chamber
additionally noted that "a crime committed several months after, or several kilometres away from
the main attack could still, if sufficiently connected otherwise, be part of that attack." 177 Article
5 of the Statute grants jurisdiction over crimes "committed in armed conflict," but the Trial
Chamber in Brdjanin, citing favorably the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac, held this to be different
than that required in Article 3 crimes (violations of the laws and customs of war), which requires
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a "close relationship" between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict. 178 Instead, "the
nexus with the armed conflict under Article 5 is 'a purely jurisdictional prerequisite which is
satisfied by proof that there was an armed conflict and that objectively the acts of the accused are
linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict.'" 179
Significantly, crimes against humanity do not require that the acts of the accused and the
attack itself must have been committed pursuant to a pre-existing policy or plan. 180 The
existence of a plan or policy, however, may be relevant when proving the elements, namely,
whether the attack was widespread or systematic, and whether the attack was directed against the
civilian population. 181 But these elements may be sufficiently proved through reference to other
evidence without resorting to proving up a plan or policy. 182 Other factors that may be
considered in determining whether an attack is widespread or systematic include the
consequences of the attack upon the targeted population; the number of victims from the attack;
the nature of the acts within the attack; the participation, if any, of officials and authorities; and
any identifiable patterns of crimes. 183
The third common element to all crimes against humanity is that the widespread or
systematic attack must be "directed against a civilian population." 184 When determining what
constitutes a "civilian population," the court must look to the state of customary international law
at the time of commission of the act. 185 The Appeals Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez established
that the definition of civilians and civilian populations used in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I
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reflects customary international law. 186 The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic affirmed the Appeals
Chamber's elaboration in Kunarac on the meaning of a "civilian population," stating that:
the use of the word "population" does not mean that the entire population of the geographical entity in
which the attack is taking place must have been subjected to that attack. It is sufficient to show that enough
individuals were targeted in the course of the attack, or that they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy
the Chamber that the attack was in fact directed against a civilian "population", rather than against a limited
and randomly selected number of individuals. 187

The phrase "directed against" is satisfied when the civilian population is "the primary object of
the attack," which may be found after considering, inter alia, the means and method of the attack,
the status and number of the victims, the discriminatory nature of the attack and the crimes
committed in its course, and the resistance to the attackers and the extent to which they complied
with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war. 188 If the alleged crimes were committed
in the course of an armed conflict, the court will look to the laws of war in order to assess the
nature of the attack and the lawfulness of those acts. 189
The burden of proof as to whether a person falls within one of the protected civilian
categories lies with the prosecution. 190 The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic determined, after
considering Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention 191 and Article 50 of Additional
Protocol I, 192 that:
members of the armed forces, and members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces, cannot claim civilian status. Neither can members of organized resistance groups, provided that
they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, that they have a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, that they carry arms openly, and that they conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war. However, the Appeals Chamber considers that the presence within a
population of members of resistance groups, or former combatants, who have laid down their arms, does
not alter its civilian characteristic. 193
186
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The language seems workable upon first glance but it leaves open the question as to what
happens when the attack was directed towards individual combatants who are among the
"civilian population." Because the population is considered civilian in nature despite the
presence of soldiers or members of a resistance group, does an attack on those individuals
constitute a widespread or systematic attack on the "civilian population"?
The answer might be found in the Brdjanin Trial Judgment. When discussing the victims
of an attack, the Trial Chamber noted that the attack does not have to target the entire civilian
population in that area, but it also must not have been directed against a "limited and randomly
selected number of individuals." 194 Therefore, this language suggests that a limited attack on a
specifically targeted (i.e., non-random) small group of insurgents, for example, would not be
considered an attack for purposes of this element. 195
The fourth common element is that the perpetrator must act with "knowledge that his acts
formed part of the broader criminal attack." This mental element may be further broken down
into two distinct mental sub-elements: 1) knowledge that there is an attack on a civilian
population; and 2) knowledge that his acts comprise part of that attack. Regarding both subelements, actual knowledge must be present; knowledge of the risk is not enough. The Appeals
Chamber in Blaskic stated, "The Trial Chamber, in stating that it 'suffices that he knowingly took
the risk of participating in the implementation of the ideology, policy or plan,' did not correctly
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articulate the mens rea applicable to crimes against humanity." 196 The Blaskic Appeals further
explained:
the motives of the accused for taking part in the attack are irrelevant and a crime against humanity may be
committed for purely personal reasons. Furthermore, the accused need not share the purpose or goal
behind the attack. It is also irrelevant whether the accused intended his acts to be directed against the
targeted population or merely against his victim. It is the attack, not the acts of the accused, which must be
directed against the target population and the accused need only know that his acts are part thereof. At
most, evidence that he committed the acts for purely personal reasons could be indicative of a rebuttable
assumption that he was not aware that his acts were part of that attack. 197

Earlier decisions at the ICTY, such as the Trial Judgment in Kunarac, determined that that
knowledge would be satisfied if the offender willingly took the risk that his acts comprised part
of a larger criminal act, regardless of whether he had actual knowledge. Later decisions
disagreed, holding that the accused must have knowledge of the attack and knowledge that his
act is part thereof. 198 The offender does not, however, need to have intimate or even peripheral
details of the attack.
In addition to the two mens rea sub-elements, there is a third mental intent that must
exist—the intent to commit the underlying criminal act that constitutes the crime against
humanity. 199 No further intent is required. Unlike the crime of persecution, crimes against
humanity (as a whole) do not require discriminatory intent. 200

196

Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 126.
Id. ¶ 124 (quoting Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 103 (footnotes omitted)).
198
See, e.g., Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 126; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 99, 103.
199
Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 99 (citing Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 124, referring to Tadic,
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 248; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 99, 102) (stating that the mens rea for crimes against
humanity is "satisfied when the accused has the requisite intent to commit the underlying offence(s) with which he is
charged, and when he knows that there is an attack on the civilian population and also knows that his acts comprise
part of that attack.").
200
Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 305. Other international instruments support the proposition that crimes against
humanity in general, excluding persecution, do not require a discriminatory intent. Those instruments include the
Tokyo Charter, Control Council No. 10 and its jurisprudence, and the Rome Statute. Notably, the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda differs, in that discriminatory intent is explicitly required for all crimes
against humanity. See Swaak-Goldman, supra note 156, at 256-257.
197

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 77

C. Elements of Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity
Since World War II, the concept of persecution has crept more and more into the lexicon
of international law. Several legal instruments have applied to various contexts the principle that
one should not be targeted or discriminated against based solely on an inherent characteristic
such as ethnicity or a set of beliefs such as religion or politics. 201 But even though many post1945 international conventions and declarations denounce discriminatory practices that result in
persecution, none of them, except for the 1973 Apartheid Convention, actually criminalizes
violations. 202 Within municipal law, Professor Bassiouni has noted that there is no crime by the
name of "persecution" in any of the world's major legal systems. 203 After considering the
common beliefs and definitions of "persecution" used in pre-1945 dictionaries in those countries,
however, his proposed definition is:
"State action or policy" leading to the infliction upon an individual of harassment, torment, oppression, or
discriminatory measures, designed to or likely to produce physical or mental suffering or economic harm,
because of the victim's beliefs, views, or membership in a given identifiable group (religious, social, ethnic,
linguistic etc.), or simply because the perpetrator sought to single out a given category of victims for
reasons peculiar to the perpetrator. 204

In its first full trial on the merits, the ICTY considered this definition in determining the elements
of persecution and the contexts in which it should be considered. 205
The crime of persecution is among the crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5
of the ICTY Statute, along with murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
201
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torture, rape, and "other inhumane acts." 206 Because persecution, like many other offenses in
international criminal law, has not a long history of positive formulations and was largely
without case law precedent, the Tribunal first needed to provide the elemental framework. After
its initial elucidations, over the years the Tribunal has continually reexamined the substance of
the crime. 207 This has resulted in numerous permutations on the exact elements and definition of
persecution.
Despite the unclear, and sometimes conflicting, jurisprudence on persecution, the
Tribunal now prefers and commonly uses the formulation espoused by the Appeals Chamber in
Kordic and Cerkez. It defined persecution that constitutes a crime against humanity as:
an act or omission which:
1. discriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international
customary or treaty law (the actus reus); and
2. was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically
race, religion or politics (the mens rea). 208

This definition clearly demonstrates that there are two distinct elements to persecutions. Another
definition that has been used on several occasions is the "the gross or blatant denial, on
discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty
law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5." 209 Although the
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two are similar, the Appeals Chamber has predominantly used the two-part definition in recent
cases. 210
The first element of the definition of persecution comprises two sub-elements: 1) the act
or omission must discriminate in fact; and 2) the act or omission must deny or infringe upon a
fundamental right. Regarding the first sub-element, early Tribunal jurisprudence held that the
actus reus must have discriminatory consequences in fact, that is, there is a discriminatory
element to the actus reus, in that discriminatory intent alone was not sufficient. 211 In Kvocka,
however, the Trial Chamber rejected this approach, instead stating that "if a person was targeted
for abuse because she was suspected of belonging to the Muslim group, the discrimination
element is met even if the suspicion proves inaccurate." 212 This seemed to be an anomaly as the
Trial Chamber in Krnojelac later contradicted Kvocka on this point, noting that "[t]he existence
of a mistaken belief that the intended victim will be discriminated against, together with an
intention to discriminate against that person because of that mistaken belief, may in some
circumstances amount to the inchoate offence of attempted persecution, but no such crime falls
within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal." 213 The Trial Chamber in Krnojelac sided with what it
deemed to be the view consistently taken since the Tribunal first addressed the issue (minus the
Kvocka Trial Chamber decision), 214 and stated that it is the discriminatory consequences in
addition to the discriminatory intent that give persecution its unique character and sets it apart
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from other crimes against humanity. 215 But again, the Tribunal changed course on this point and
stated in Brdjanin that persecution can occur in the case of mistaken identity. 216
The second sub-element (i.e., that the act or omission must deny or infringe upon a
fundamental right) is less concrete. The Statute of the ICTY does not provide a list of acts that
may constitute persecutions as a crime against humanity, but the Tribunal has established a
jurisdictional limit. The Appeals Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez stated that "the acts underlying
persecutions as a crime against humanity, whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with
other acts, must constitute a crime of persecutions of gravity equal to the crimes listed in Article
5 of the Statute." 217 Thus, the act must "constitute a denial of or infringement upon a
fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law,"218 and for purposes of
legality, the act must have constituted a crime against humanity in either customary international
law or international treaty law at the time of commission. 219
Notably, all persecutions will involve the denial of a fundamental human right but not all
denials of fundamental human rights will constitute persecution. 220 Certain denials may not
reach the level of seriousness required. Determining what constitutes a denial or infringement
upon a fundamental right is imprecise but the contents of the Statute provide a foundation.
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The criminal acts underlying a charge of persecution may be enumerated within Article 5
or elsewhere in the Statute, or may even be found outside the Statute. 221 Crimes enumerated in
Article 5 are "by definition" serious enough to constitute a crime against humanity. For instance,
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, and other
inhumane acts will all sustain a charge of persecution. Other crimes enumerated elsewhere in the
Statute as well as those not enumerated in the Statute, must meet an additional test. They "must
reach the same level of gravity as the other crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5 of
the Statute," which "will only be met by gross or blatant denials of fundamental human
rights." 222 Interestingly, the language of this test mirrors language used in the earlier definition
of persecution provided by the Tribunal. Several crimes found within Article 2 are also found
within Article 5, and thus, they undoubtedly meet the gravity test and require no analytical
justification. 223
Crimes not enumerated within the Statute itself but that may rise to the level of the
Article 5 crimes include, for example, the use of human shields 224 and outrages upon personal
dignity, including harassment, humiliation, and psychological abuse. 225 An example of a crime
that does not in itself constitute persecution would be unlawful arrest. 226 The crime constitutes
the denial and infringement upon a personal right, but standing alone, it does not amount to the
level of gravity as the enumerated Article 5 crimes against humanity. The unlawful arrest would
need to be combined with other acts, such as unlawful detention or inhumane living conditions,
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in order to warrant a finding of persecution.227 In this respect, the Tribunal takes a holistic
approach when determining whether a set of circumstances, rather than an individual act,
combine to form the crime of persecution.
Significantly, physical injury to the person is not required for there to have been
persecution. The Blaskic Appeals Chamber favorably quoted the Trial Judgment, stating that
persecutions "may take forms other than injury to the human person, in particular those acts
rendered serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the discrimination they seek to instill within
humankind." 228 Therefore, the confiscation or destruction of private dwellings and businesses,
symbolic or historical buildings, or the means of subsistence, may all constitute persecution. 229
Attacks on personal property might even warrant a finding of persecution if the attack was
committed with the requisite discriminatory intent. Whereas an attack on the physical person
may not be as contextually-based, instances dealing with the arguably less-serious attack on
personal property require a high degree of contextualization. For example, the burning of a car,
by itself, does not amount to persecution. However, if that car was the only means of transport
the head-of-household had to get to work and go to market, and was essential to the family's
survival, then a finding of persecution may be more warranted. 230 Attacks on communal
property also may amount to persecution. The destruction of and damage to religious and
educational institutions might arise to the level of gravity as those crimes enumerated in Article
5. 231
The appropriate method of deducing whether a crime has reached the requisite level of
gravity is elusive. Based on the Tribunal's decisions, it is unclear how to consider fully the
227
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interplay between the first and second elements of persecution (i.e., the relationship between the
act and the discriminatory intent) in determining what crimes may amount to persecution. What
factor or factors contribute to the gravity analysis in determining the seriousness of the crime? In
other words, should the court determine whether the act itself (considered without any
discriminatory intent) reaches the same gravity, essentially considering the act in a vacuum? Or
may an act reach the level of gravity by way of the act when combined with discriminatory
intent, thus taking a more contextually-based approach?
In Blaskic, the Appeals Chamber considered whether the Trial Chamber appropriately
addressed this issue. The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had erred in failing to
consider the gravity of the underlying acts by themselves, and held that "it is not enough that the
underlying acts be perpetrated with a discriminatory intent." 232 The Trial Chamber had
"appeared to consider, erroneously, that underlying acts are rendered sufficiently grave if they
are committed with a discriminatory intent." 233 This view was supported by the Appeals
Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez, which stated that "not every act, if committed with the requisite
discriminatory intent, amounts to persecutions as a crime against humanity." 234 This language,
however, does not fully settle the issue. At other points in the Blaskic judgment, the Appeals
Chamber approvingly quoted the Trial Chamber, stating that "'the crime of 'persecution'
encompasses not only bodily and mental harm and infringements upon individual freedom but
also acts which appear less serious, such as those targeting property, so long as the victimized
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persons were specially selected on grounds linked to their belonging to a particular
community.'" 235 The Appeals Chamber further quoted the Trial Chamber:
It is the specific intent to cause injury to a human being because he belongs to a particular community or
group, rather than the means employed to achieve it, that bestows on it its individual nature and gravity and
which justifies its being able to constitute criminal acts which might appear in themselves not to infringe
directly upon the most elementary rights of a human being, for example, attacks on property. In other
words, the perpetrator of the acts of persecution does not initially target the individual but rather
membership in a specific racial, religious or political group. 236

By focusing on the discriminatory nature of the act, as opposed to the act itself, the number of
acts includable becomes limitless. In Kvocka, the Trial Chamber raised holdings by World War
II trials that found certain denials to Jews, such as the freedom to marry, to bank accounts, and to
educational and employment opportunities, constituted persecution, and thus, "acts that are not
inherently criminal may nonetheless become criminal and persecutorial if committed with
discriminatory intent." 237 Such an approach allows any act to become persecution by sole reason
of its discriminatory application.
The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic proposed a method for determining what acts may
constitute persecution, but it does not fully complete the issue. The court simply rehashes
previous statements that the court should first determine whether the act underlying the
persecution constituted a crime against humanity in customary international law, which in turn
must involve a denial or infringement upon a fundamental right granted under customary
international law. 238 The proposal suggests that not every act, even if committed with
discriminatory intent, would amount to a persecution as a crime against humanity. 239 The
principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege, must be considered throughout the process, 240 in
235
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that the Tribunal may only convict someone of a crime if it was a violation of customary
international law or international treaty law at the time of commission. 241 But despite this
attempted formulation, and its focus on the significance of the act itself in examining whether it
amounts to persecution, the Appeals Chamber in Blaskic, as well as in Kordic and Cerkez, fails
to state outright the role of discriminatory intent in the analysis of gravity.
A proposed clarification, then, would be to consider only the act itself, without any
consideration of potential or alleged discriminatory intent, and determine whether the act is of
equal gravity as the enumerated crimes in Article 5. If the act, standing alone, reaches the level
of rape or murder, for example, then the act will constitute persecution when committed with
discriminatory intent. Allowing acts to become persecution simply by way of an evil intent
behind them is a dangerous precedent and is tantamount to hate crimes statutes, legislation that is
not altogether popular in the U.S. This type of analysis would provide the Tribunal with clarity
and fairness in determining what acts may constitute persecution.
The second part in the definition of persecution—the mental element—also consists of
several parts. In addition to the three intents required for all crimes against humanity, which are
the knowledge of an attack, the knowledge that his criminal acts are a part of that attack, and the
intent to commit the underlying act, the act must also have been committed with the specific
intent to discriminate on political, religious, or racial grounds. 242 The Statute conjunctively lists
the three grounds: "persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds"; 243 but nevertheless,
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the Tribunal rejected the notion that all three bases must be present in order to constitute
persecution. 244 Only one ground is necessary to establish a finding of persecution. 245
The distinct mental element of persecution sets it apart from other crimes. The crime of
persecution, when considered amongst the other crimes against humanity, "derives its unique
character from the requirement of a specific discriminatory intent." 246 For this discriminatory
intent, "[i]t is not sufficient for the accused to be aware that he is in fact acting in a way that is
discriminatory; he must consciously intend to discriminate. While the intent to discriminate need
not be the primary intent with respect to the act, it must be a significant one." 247 As with crimes
against humanity in general, persecution does not require the existence of a plan or policy to
discriminate, and if a plan or policy does exist, there is no requirement that the accused be aware
that his persecutory act is a part of the larger plan or policy.
One important question is the manner in which the prosecution may establish and the
Trial Chamber may find discriminatory intent. Documents and other incriminating direct
evidence of the perpetrator's intent are often lacking or difficult to obtain.248 The prosecution
has attempted to remedy this by inferring discriminatory intent for the individual act from the
general discriminatory nature of a broader attack. Early cases appeared to support this stance, 249
but later cases were more equivocal. Although the Appeals Chamber in Kvocka stated that
discriminatory intent may not be inferred solely from the discriminatory nature of an attack, it
also stated that intent "may be inferred from such a context as long as, in view of the facts of the
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case, circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged acts substantiate the existence of
such intent." 250 Those circumstances include the "systematic nature of the crimes committed
against a racial or religious group and the general attitude of the alleged perpetrator as
demonstrated by his behaviour." 251 Inferring discriminatory intent for a specific individual act
from the discriminatory nature of a larger attack may result in the correct conclusion for many of
the acts committed within that discriminatory context, but not correct for others because "there
may be acts committed within the context that were committed either on discriminatory grounds
not listed in the Statute, or for purely personal reasons." 252 There must be evidence linking a
discriminatory intent to the specific act rather than the attack in general, which, as explained
above, does not need be discriminatory. 253
Despite its alleged reluctance, on several occasions the Tribunal has inferred
discriminatory intent from larger contextual attacks. 254 For example, in Krnojelac and Kvocka
the Appeals Chamber found that beatings and detentions, respectively, were perpetrated largely
against the non-Serb population, and therefore, it was reasonable to conclude that the individual
acts were committed based on discriminatory purposes, involving the requisite discriminatory
intent. 255 Specifically, in Kvocka, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's inferred
discriminatory intent as a result of the accused's "knowledge of the persecutory nature of the
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crimes, and his knowing participation in the system of persecution pervading Omarska camp." 256
In another example, in its legal finding on General Krstic's responsibility for alleged
persecutions, the Trial Chamber found him guilty but did not address the specific intent of
General Krstic, instead quickly summating in a one-sentence paragraph that "[t]he Trial Chamber
has previously determined that a widespread and systematic attack was launched against the
Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica from 11 July onwards, by reason of their belonging to
the Bosnian Muslim group." 257 The Trial Chamber then concluded that the crime of persecution
had been committed. 258 Thus, despite language suggesting that discriminatory intent may not be
inferred from the general discriminatory nature of the attack, it appears that a perpetrator's
discriminatory intent may be inferred from knowledge of the surrounding events.
Another means through which the Tribunal has found intent is based on the perpetrator's
apparent tendencies. In Kordic and Cerkez, the Appeals Chamber found the requisite
discriminatory intent for persecutions, based on evidence "concerning Kordic's political activities
and inclinations, his strongly nationalist and ethnical stance, and his desire to attain the sovereign
Croatian state within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at seemingly any cost." 259 This
suggests that one's general racist, discriminatory attitude towards a certain people is enough to
justify finding one's individual acts are discriminatory, essentially discrimination per se. This
effectively shifts the burden of proof to the defense, having to prove that he committed the act
with a non-discriminatory intent. Such a burden-shifting scheme is anathematic to the basic
principles of criminal law, whether in the municipal or international arena.
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Notably, a discriminatory intent should not be confused with a "persecutory intent." The
former is the signature element of persecutions as a crime against humanity whereas the latter is
not required. 260 The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic stated that "there is no requirement in law that
the actor possess a 'persecutory intent' over and above a discriminatory intent." 261 In other
words, "a showing of a specific persecutory intent behind an alleged persecutory plan or policy,
that is, the removal of targeted persons from society or humanity, is not required to establish the
mens rea of the perpetrator carrying out the underlying physical acts of persecutions." 262
Discriminatory intent should not be confused or conflated with motive. The Appeals
Chamber in Kvocka distinguished motive from discriminatory intent, agreeing with the Trial
Chamber that "crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons," 263 and
that "[p]ersonal motives, such as settling old scores, or seeking personal gain, do not exclude
discriminatory intent." 264 Motive is only relevant at the sentencing stage for purposes of
mitigation or aggravation; it plays no role in the finding of criminal intent. 265
Yet despite the court's valid attempt in Kvocka to distinguish motive from discriminatory
intent, the approach it used seemingly discounted the express language of the Statute that
requires the specific intent to discriminate on one of only three grounds: racial, religious, or
political. Crimes against humanity in general, because they do not require a discriminatory
intent, may be committed for purely personal reasons. Persecution, conversely, requires
discriminatory intent, and the court in Kvocka should have specified that persecution may not be
committed on the basis of purely personal reasons (unless, of course, those personal reasons were
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based on discrimination). For example, if a Bosnian Serb killed a Bosnian Muslim on the basis
of his ethnicity, say, in the name of a Greater Serbia, persecution certainly has occurred.
However, if the Serb took advantage of the chaos ensuing in a conflict and opportunistically
killed the Muslim for purposes of an old debt, the basis for the act was not discriminatory,
especially not on the basis of the three grounds. Nonetheless, the Kvocka Appeals Chamber
attempted to illustrate the interconnectedness of a discriminatory intent and the motive:
Edin Ganic only became a possible object of Zigic's demands because he was detained as a Muslim and
could offer no resistance, whereas Zigic was, as a member of the security forces, in a position of authority
over him. The discriminatory intent and the personal covetous motive are not mutually exclusive, rather
closely interlocked. In fact, the coercive demands for money from the detainees helped to create the
atmosphere of insecurity, harassment and humiliation in the camps. 266

The situation described above occurred only after a Muslim had been detained on discriminatory
grounds, and despite a potentially non-discriminatory personal motive for extorting money, the
Appeals Chamber upheld the conviction.
This approach effectively eliminates the specific intent required in persecutions, and
lowers the requisite mens rea to one of knowledge that the perpetrator's position over the victim
(which allows for the personal motive to be acted upon) was based on discriminatory grounds.
This suggests that even if the motivation was purely personal, but that the accused was aware of
a larger discriminatory attack, he would be considered to have the requisite discriminatory intent,
despite his purely personal reasons for committing the specific act. This is further reinforced by
the notion that the crime of persecution targets the group rather than the individual, and thus, if
one kills another for purposes of a debt or family reprisal, the individual has been targeted rather
than the group. 267
What if discriminatory intent is only part of the reason for perpetrating the crime?
According to the Trial Chamber in Krnojelac, "[w]hile the intent to discriminate need not be the
266
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primary intent with respect to the act, it must be a significant one." 268 This raises further
questions. Does "significant" mean more than 50-50? If the intent to discriminate does not need
to the be the "primary intent," then other reasons may be the predominant reason, with
discriminatory intent only being an additional thought, or perhaps even an after-thought. Taking
this language to its natural conclusion, the Tribunal could, according to Krnojelac, find
persecution when an individual decided to rob an individual for purely financial gain, as long as
that individual harbored any discriminatory intent whatsoever. Consider an armed Kosovar
Albanian approaching another man on the street at night intending to rob him, unknowing that
his intended victim was Serbian. The Kosovar Albanian shouts at the man to give him his
money, and the man responds in a distinct Serbian accent. The Kosovar Albanian shouts again,
and this time interjects a racial slur. Does this constitute discriminatory intent, and is it
"significant" enough to constitute persecution? Because persecution is a unique crime distinct
from other crimes against humanity, and other crimes in general, this question should be
answered in the negative. In order to amount to persecution, discriminatory intent should be the
primary intent; it need not be the only intent, but it should be the primary intent for perpetrating
the underlying criminal act.

IV.

Justifications for Criminalizing Persecution: Cues from Bias Crimes Legislation
in the U.S.
The rich debate in the U.S. on the validity and wisdom of bias crimes legislation sheds

light on the nature of persecution and its enforcement. Although bias crimes are popularly
referred to as "hate crimes," such characterization is a misnomer and does not properly
encompass the scope of these crimes. Depending on the statute, the crux of a bias crime is
268
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prejudice rather than hate, that is, bias crimes may be committed without hate, and crimes may
be committed with hate but are not necessarily a bias crime. 269 Some statutes do, however,
require ill-will and animus toward the victim.
Like the persecution clause in Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute, all state and federal bias
crimes statutes list categories of classes that may not be discriminated against (e.g., race, color,
ethnicity, national origin, and religion). 270 Determining what classes to protect against should be
considered with the larger social context in mind. 271 Classes traditionally subjected to
discrimination and victim to widespread antipathy are justifiable inclusions. 272
Professor Frederick M. Lawrence separates bias crime statues into three distinct models:
the "discriminatory selection" model, the "racial animus model," and the "because of" or "by
reason" formulations. 273 The "discriminatory selection model" defines the crime in terms of the
perpetrator's discriminatory and intentional selection of the victim; the prejudice occurs at the
selection process. Hate, racial animosity, or any other reason need not play a role in the selection
as long as the victim was selected on the basis of that particular characteristic. The "racial
animus model" defines crimes in terms of the perpetrator's prejudicial motivation in selecting the
victim. 274 The perpetrator selected the particular victim on the basis of racial animosity towards
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that victim's class. 275 The third model tends to blur the distinction between the first two models,
and statutes within this category are not always clear what and how they will punish under their
statutes. If applying Lawrence's trichotomy to the ICTY, it could be said that the Tribunal
follows the discriminatory model approach.
Opponents of bias crimes statutes have challenged their constitutionality, but the U.S.
Supreme Court recently upheld a state law based on the discriminatory selection model. 276 The
statute at issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell called for a penalty enhancement for crimes committed
with animus. On top of the two years for aggravated battery, the defendant would receive five
additional years as a result of the enhancement. Wisconsin argued that the reason for selecting
the victim, such as racial animosity or ill-will toward the group, was irrelevant. The only
relevant factor was whether he selected the victim based on a listed class. The defendant argued
that the statute violated the First Amendment by punishing thoughts, which is what the
Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously held. 277 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and
ultimately upheld the law, finding that the penalty enhancement was aimed at conduct not
protected by the First Amendment, but it is not altogether clear whether the Court
wholeheartedly accepted the discriminatory model. 278
After establishing the constitutionality of bias crimes legislation, it is interesting to
consider who might be liable for such crimes. In the only U.S. case found by this author that
involves accomplice liability for a bias crime, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated a bias
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crime penalty enhancement because the jury had not been properly instructed on that particular
theory of party-to-a-crime liability. 279 The case involved a group of four Asian men that shouted
racial epithets at an African-American man after he exited a convenience store. They attacked
the man and continued the racial slur onslaught. Other Asian individuals then converged on the
scene and the group grew to over fifteen. The defendant, an Asian male, who was perhaps the
ninth individual to arrive, joined in the beating along with the others. Racial slurs continued
throughout the attack, including before and after the defendant arrived.
The jury found him liable for the bias crime penalty enhancement, which increased his
crime from a misdemeanor to a felony punishable by up to two years' imprisonment. On appeal
the defendant argued that the jury instructions improperly allowed the jury to find him liable for
the penalty enhancement even absent a finding that he was aware the victim had been selected on
discriminatory grounds. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals raised the issue of whether an
accomplice may be held liable for a bias crime under the "natural and foreseeable consequences"
doctrine where the accomplice was unaware of the discriminatory selection. The state argued
that such a finding was possible. Instead of ruling on that issue, though, the court of appeals
focused solely on the jury instructions, holding that the instructions allowed the jury to find him
liable for his co-perpetrators' discriminatory selection even though he was unaware of it.
Because that theory of vicarious liability had not been presented in the jury instructions, the court
vacated the enhancement. 280 Although the court did not expressly allow or disallow vicarious
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liability for bias crimes, this is the only case that has raised the issue. The lack of case law
provides an opportunity to examine fully the merits of employing vicarious liability for bias
crimes.
When considering whether to hold an accomplice liable for the "natural and probable
consequences" of, for example, a robbery, a court assesses the situation objectively. If two
armed individuals walk into a liquor store, is the killing of the cashier by one of the assailants a
natural and probable consequence of the plan to rob the store? Under traditional accomplice
liability theory, the answer is yes. The non-shooting participant in the robbery could have
foreseen this result as being a natural and probable consequence of the original crime (armed
robbery), and therefore, that individual is held responsible as a direct perpetrator for the
additional crime (murder). The foreseeability is objectively measured.
But should we apply this same logic to bias crimes, where a co-perpetrator subjectively
harbors discriminatory thoughts? Is it objectively foreseeable that the partner-in-crime would
discriminatorily select another in the commission of a crime? To answer this question a court
must consider the direct perpetrator subjectively, that is, it must add personality and context to
the individual's thoughts, and perhaps his actions. The metamorphosis from an armed robbery to
a murder is not difficult for a reasonable person to comprehend; the transition from an armed
robbery to murder because of the victim's race is highly abnormal. The latter situation is
atypical, and thus, from an objective standpoint, the commission of a bias crime would never be
a natural and probable consequence of another crime unless the court looks into the mind of the
direct perpetrator. This leads back to a subjective standard. Therefore, a defendant would be
According to the court of appeals, this left the jury three choices: first, find the defendant personally selected the
victim on the basis of race; second, find that "another person who committed the battery" selected the victim on the
basis of race; or third, find that no one had intentionally selected the victim on the basis of race. Under these
instructions, the court of appeals concluded that the jury could have imposed the bias crime penalty enhancement
liability regardless of the defendant's awareness of any such discriminatory selection.
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liable not only for his accomplice's direct acts but also for the reasons his accomplice committed
those crimes. A defendant could essentially be held liable for his accomplice's thoughts.
But why are bias crimes, and by comparison the crime of persecution, so bad and why
should they be legislated against? Why should they be considered separate from their underlying
criminal offense? Bias crimes are often assumed to be worse than other crimes. The murdering
of a liquor store owner to get at his cash register receives less public attention than when a group
of young white men attack and kill an African-American, or when a neo-Nazi assaults a Jewish
man while shouting racial epithets. We generally perceive crimes on the basis of skin color,
national origin, or any other immutable characteristic to be morally reprehensible. Those crimes
are often considered more serious than the same crime when committed in the absence of
prejudicial motivation. Should this be the case?
Proponents defend bias crimes legislation on several grounds. First, the perpetrator's
motive makes him more culpable. We regularly equate one's motive with culpability, e.g., many
perceive a husband facilitating his terminally-ill wife's voluntary poisoning as being less
culpable than the same husband killing his healthy wife for the insurance proceeds.281 Second,
bias crimes may result in greater physical and psychological impact on the victim. The victim
may suffer not only from an increased physical injury, usually due to the violent and group-based
nature of bias crimes, but also from severe psychological problems. 282 The victim might become
more isolated, reserved from society, lose relationships, etc. Third, bias crimes greatly affect the
group to whom the victim belonged. 283 A bias crime "attacks the victim not only physically but
281
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at the very core of his identity. It is an attack from which there is no escape." 284 When an
African-American man is targeted and attacked by a group of white men, African-Americans in
that community may feel threatened and vulnerable and begin to fear all whites, or may alter
their lifestyle, such as not shopping, eating, or walking in that neighborhood. African-Americans
will feel as though they were attacked personally, because a fellow member of their class was
attacked, and the arbitrary nature of the crime suggests that it easily could have been them
instead of the unfortunate victim. Additionally, members of that class will feel a reverse
collective animosity, in that African-Americans will feel angry towards all whites even though
only one or a few individuals perpetrated the heinous crime. Fourth, bias crimes affect society as
a whole. Bias crimes "can frighten and humiliate other members of the community" and
"reinforce social divisions and hatred." 285 Individuals will withdraw from community activity,
public interaction will decrease, and conflicts may erupt. The Oregon Supreme Court, in
upholding a bias crime statute, stated:
[Hate crime] creates a harm to society distinct from and greater than the harm caused by the assault alone.
Such crimes—because they are directed not only toward the victim but, in essence, toward an entire group
of which the victim is perceived to be a member—invite imitation, retaliation, and insecurity on the part of
persons in the group to which the victim was perceived by the assailants to belong. 286

Other rationales given for criminalizing bias crimes include moral education and their greater
deterrence factor.
Professor Allison Danner advances another (and unique) justification for punishing bias
crimes, arguing that bias crimes are legitimately punishable when seen through the prism of
crimes against humanity. Rather than advocating the wrongfulness-culpability model of
punishment, which focuses on the individual motivations for the act, she focuses on the
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individual's "choice to act in a particular way within his social context." 287 Danner argues that
the person who acted discriminatorily, regardless of his motivations, should be punished when he
knew how his acts fit within the larger social context and how those acts would affect society as
a whole.
All of these reasons, whether successfully argued or not, pertain to justifying the
punishment of bias crimes in general. Many of the same reasons are easily applicable to
justifying the criminalization of persecution. These reasons do not, however, speak to the
punishment of the individual. Justifications for criminal punishment generally fall within two
schools of punishment theory: retribution and "consequentalist." 288 Retribution theory focuses
on making the criminal pay for his crime, essentially the eye-for-an-eye rationale. The
"consequentalist" theory of punishment seeks to improve the overall well-being of a society in a
utilitarian fashion. 289 This theory encompasses four methods in obtaining the maximum utility:
general deterrence, specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 290
When taking these theories of punishment into account, we see that holding one liable for
another's discriminatory act simply because the direct perpetrator's acts were foreseeable to the
other does not bode well with any of these theories. If society condemns discriminatory behavior
and requires retribution, then society will improperly hold one responsible for a crime he did not
intend. Two methods of the consequentialist theory—rehabilitation and incapacitation—
similarly fail. An individual who does not harbor bias (or hate) towards certain groups cannot be
rehabilitated—there is no rehabilitation to occur! Incapacitation will not serve any purpose
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because it is not likely, based on the unintended discriminatory consequences of his crime, that
society will be any safer from discriminatory-based crimes than before incarceration.
The methods of deterrence offer more, although still extremely limited, promise for
advocates of vicarious liability for bias crimes and persecution. Aspiring criminals may be
dissuaded from engaging in any criminal behavior for fear that their co-perpetrator may commit
a crime on discriminatory grounds. Although highly unlikely, these individuals might stay at
home altogether. The same holds true for specific deterrence. If someone is punished for the
bias crime or persecution by another, that person may forego any criminal behavior for fear of
future penalty enhancement due to his discrimination-motivated partner-in-crime. Both specific
and general deterrence, however, have very limited utility with respect to punishing an individual
for the thoughts of another.

V.

The Convergence of Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability and Specific Intent
Crimes
The crimes of persecution (as a crime against humanity) and genocide are two specific

intent crimes that have figured prominently in the development of the ICTY. Because the
Tribunal has considered the crimes to come from the same genus, in that the crux of both crimes
is the intent to target certain persons based on their belonging to a particular group, 291 both
crimes are examined here. In fact, "from the viewpoint of mens rea, genocide is an extreme and
more inhuman form of persecution." 292
As discussed above, the crime of persecution requires a specific discriminatory intent,
based on political, racial, or religious grounds. This mens rea is higher than for other crimes
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against humanity, but lower than that required for genocide, 293 which requires the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, an entire ethnic group. 294 Also noted above, JCE liability requires
the intent to participate in that enterprise. This leads to yet another interesting question: In
addition to the intent to participate in a criminal enterprise, does a participant also need to share
the specific intent (i.e., discriminatory intent) for specific intent crimes, before liability attaches
to such crimes?
The Appeals Chamber in Kvocka did not deem it relevant to distinguish between the
intents, stating that:
in the context of the case, the intent to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise and discriminatory intent is
one and the same thing. The same conclusion must then be reached when determining whether the facts of
the case could have led a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Kvocka shared the discriminatory intent
of the perpetrators of the crimes committed in furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise. 295

The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber's finding that Kvocka had the intent to
contribute to the JCE, and therefore, he necessarily had the intent to discriminate. 296 When
Kvocka apparently asserted that "the Trial Chamber erred by not systematically analysing the
discriminatory nature of the crimes committed in Omarska camp," the Appeals Chamber referred
to the finding of the discriminatory intent of the JCE, thus apparently satisfying the requisite
mens rea. 297 According to the Kvocka judgment, the prosecution need not establish a
discriminatory intent for each single act (if there are multiple acts), as long as it proves that the
JCE was discriminatory and that the individual joined the JCE. This leads to yet another
question: does the original fundamental purpose of the JCE need to have been discriminatory in
nature, or does the JCE simply need to have committed acts discriminatorily?
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The Appeals Chamber in Kvocka addressed the issue of whether a participant in a JCE
needs to share the discriminatory intent for special intent crimes, and affirmed the Trial
Chamber's holding:
Where the crime requires special intent … the accused must also satisfy the additional requirements
imposed by the crime, such as the intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds if he is a
co-perpetrator. However, if he is an aider or abettor, he need only have knowledge of the perpetrator's
shared intent. This shared knowledge too can be inferred from the circumstances. If the criminal enterprise
entails random killing for financial profit, for instance, that would not necessarily demonstrate an intent to
discriminate on "political, racial or religious grounds". If the criminal enterprise entails killing members of
a particular ethnic group, and members of that ethnic group were of a differing religion, race, or political
group than the co-perpetrators, that would demonstrate an intent to discriminate on political, racial, or
religious grounds. Thus, a knowing and continued participation in this enterprise could evince an intent to
persecute members of the targeted ethnic group. 298

Kvocka illustrates the distinction between co-perpetratorship and aiding and abetting. For firstand second-category JCE, participants "must be shown to share the required intent of the
principal perpetrators. Thus, for crimes of persecution, the Prosecution must demonstrate that
the accused shared the common discriminatory intent of the joint criminal enterprise." 299 But
"[i]f the accused does not share the discriminatory intent, then he may still be liable as an aider
and abettor if he knowingly makes a substantial contribution to the crime." 300
With respect to third-category JCE, the prosecution must show two distinct intents, each
from a different person. First, the direct perpetrator of the crime must have possessed the
specific discriminatory intent, and second, the accused must have been "aware" that the crime
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the agreed-upon JCE. 301 The meaning of
foreseeability—i.e., whether it connotes a mere "possibility" of the crime occurring or whether
"certainty" is required 302 —has been resolved by the Trial Chamber in Krstic, stating that the

298

Id. ¶ 109 (quoting Kvocka, Trial Judgment, ¶ 288).
Kvocka, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 110 (citing Krnojelac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 111).
300
Kvocka, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 110.
301
See E. Katselli, supra note 121.
302
Id.
299

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 102

prosecution only needs to prove that "the accused was aware that the further crime was a
possible consequence" of the agreed-upon JCE. 303

A. The Relationship Between Joint Criminal Enterprise and Genocide
International criminal lawyers and human rights activists, along with public, generally
perceive genocide to be the most shocking of all crimes. The term alone evokes images of
unspeakable acts and mass graves from Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan. Because of its powerful
connotation, States even reserve the word for very limited cases, fearing that the mere mention of
genocide will force them to take positive action. 304 With such a level of seriousness, both
through the prism of law and in the eyes of the public, is genocide compatible with JCE liability?
In Stakic the prosecution sought conviction of genocide on the basis of the third-category
JCE. The Trial Chamber expressly rejected this basis of liability as being proper for genocide,
stating that "the concept of genocide as a natural and foreseeable consequence of an enterprise
not aiming specifically at genocide does not suffice." 305 The Trial Chamber further expounded:
Conflating the third variant of joint criminal enterprise and the crime of genocide would result in the dolus
specialis being so watered down that it is extinguished. Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that in order to
"commit" genocide, the elements of that crime, including the dolus specialis must be met. The notions of
"escalation" to genocide, or genocide as a "natural and foreseeable consequence" of an enterprise not aimed
specifically at genocide are not compatible with the definition of genocide under Article 4(3)(a). 306

The Trial Chamber subsequently acquitted Stakic of genocide under third-category JCE. 307
The Trial Chamber in Brdjanin reasoned similarly but the Appeals Chamber overruled
that decision, holding that an accused may be held liable for any crime that is beyond the agreed303
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upon JCE, including those with a specific intent requirement, provided that the relevant standard
is met. 308 The accused must have entered into a JCE to commit a specific crime and knew that
the commission of the agreed-upon crime made it reasonably foreseeable to him that a separate
crime would be committed by other members of the JCE. Genocide is treated the same as crimes
with no specific intent requirement; the prosecution simply needs to establish that "it was
reasonably foreseeable to the accused that an act specified in Article 4(2) would be committed
and that it would be committed with genocidal intent." 309
Strikingly, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that third-category JCE is a "lower mens
rea standard" than the other two categories. 310 The Appeals Chamber's characterization of thirdcategory JCE liability simply requires the prosecution to "prove only awareness on the part of the
accused that genocide was a foreseeable consequence of the commission of a separate agreedupon crime. This awareness of the likelihood of genocide being committed is not as strict a mens
rea requirement as the specific intent required to establish the crime of genocide." 311 The
Appeals Chamber's adherence to mere "awareness," and its own admission that this particular
mens rea does not amount to the "specific intent" for genocide, is difficult to defend. Genocide
will always subsume many individual acts; genocide, by definition, comprises hundreds or
perhaps thousands of individual crimes: rape, murder, expulsion. Each of those instances
generally falls within one of the other crimes enumerated in the ICTY Statute, most likely under
crimes against humanity or violations of the laws and customs of war. Whenever an individual
commits an individual act within a JCE, under the Brdjanin reasoning he may be found guilty of
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genocide without intending any such event as long as genocide was a foreseeable consequence of
the JCE.
In explaining its decision the Appeals Chamber referred to other forms of criminal
liability that do not require specific proof of the intent to commit the actual crime, namely, aiding
and abetting, which merely requires "knowledge on the part of the accused and substantial
contribution with that knowledge." 312 The Appeals Chamber further explained that with respect
to aiding and abetting persecution:
An accused will be held criminally responsible as an aider and abettor of the crime of persecution where,
the accused is aware of the criminal act, and that the criminal act was committed with discriminatory intent
on the part of the principal perpetrator, and that with that knowledge the accused made a substantial
contribution to the commission of that crime by the principal perpetrator. 313

This reasoning is flawed. It uses aiding and abetting, which is a less direct means of holding an
accused responsible, and thus carrying a lesser sentence, to justify a "lower" mens rea for
specific intent crimes that go beyond an agreed-upon JCE. As seen from the quote above, aiding
and abetting requires a "substantial contribution" before liability attaches, whereas no such
requirement is present in the direct forms of commission, including participation in a JCE (which
is considered a form of "commission"). Aiding and abetting may have a "lower" mens rea but
the "substantial contribution" requirement serves as a threshold for attributing responsibility.
The judgments in Krstic contribute further confusion. The Trial Chamber convicted
Krstic on grounds of JCE liability, holding that genocide was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of a JCE to ethnically cleanse Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber overruled Krstic's
guilt of genocide (and persecution 314 ) on the basis of being a co-participant in a JCE, stating that:
all that the evidence can establish is that Krstic was aware of the intent to commit genocide on the part of
some members of the VRS Main Staff, and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of Drina

312

Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 8 (citing Krnojelac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 52).
314
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 144, Case No. IT-98-33-A (Apr. 19, 2004).
313

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 105

Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings. This knowledge on his part alone cannot support
an inference of genocidal intent. 315

Thus, according to the Appeals Chamber in Krstic, awareness of others' intention to commit
genocide may not be used as a substitute for the requirement that the perpetrator must possess
genocidal intent. The Appeals Chamber continued: "[g]enocide is one of the worst crimes
known to humankind, and its gravity is reflected in the stringent requirement of specific intent.
Convictions for genocide can be entered only where that intent has been unequivocally
established." 316 There must be actual proof that the perpetrator himself possessed the genocidal
intent. Although the Appeals Chamber found Krstic not liable as a co-perpetrator for genocide
and persecution, it did find him guilty as an aider and abettor of those crimes. 317
The Tribunal has contradicted itself on the issue of JCE liability for genocide. The
Tribunal shouts loudly about the gross nature of genocide and has even reserved findings of guilt
for only those most responsible, yet it has also allowed third-category JCE liability for genocide.
This practice is dangerous, not only for purposes of clarity, but also for allowing this means of
attributing responsibility for the worst crime on the planet. Attributing mass responsibility only
results in a watering down of the crime itself, as a theory and in practice, and also lessens the
direct perpetrators' liability by spreading liability amongst those not actually responsible.
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B. The Relationship Between Joint Criminal Enterprise and Persecution
Imagine a small squad of government soldiers that decides to imprison the population of
a small village due to recent insurgent activity in the area. The soldiers then destroy all the
dwellings as a warning to other villages that may harbor or provide assistance to insurgents. If
the common plan of the soldiers was criminal, which the imprisonment of civilians and the
indiscriminate destruction of property certainly are, it can be said that they were all part of a
JCE. Through first-category JCE liability, all of the soldiers would be responsible for all of the
other soldiers' acts of imprisonment and destruction. Each participant intended the same result:
the imprisonment of the local civilian population and the destruction of civilian property. Should
one of the soldiers commit a crime that was outside the original criminal plan (imprisonment and
property destruction), his fellow soldiers would nonetheless be responsible if the commission of
that crime was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the original criminal plan. For example,
soldier A shoots and kills a civilian during the forced expulsion and imprisonment. The other
soldiers, say, B and C, would be responsible for the civilian's death because it is reasonably
foreseeable that one of the soldiers would shoot a civilian due to the tense nature of removing
villagers from their homes and shuttling them into detention camps. As discussed above, this is
classic third-category JCE liability.
But what if the common criminal plan consisted of a general intent crime and the
supposed natural and foreseeable crime was a specific intent crime, such as persecution or
genocide? It may be foreseeable that A commits an act outside the scope of the common plan,
but is it foreseeable that A will commit that act with a specific discriminatory intent? Is it
foreseeable that A will specifically target, and then rape or murder a victim because that person is
of a different racial, religious, or political background? Such an analytical process requires the
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court to look into the mind of a criminal, determine what he was thinking at the moment of
commission, and then decide whether his thinking was foreseeable to a non-perpetrating partner.
Given its staunch advocacy of the doctrine, the prosecution at the ICTY would likely
argue that B and C are still responsible for A's discriminatory act. Even if B and C attempted to
stop A from committing some persecutory act, they would still be held responsible if that act was
foreseeable. B and C are thus liable for what goes on in A's head, not merely for what acts he
commits. Analytically, it is much easier to attach liability to another's acts if those acts are based
wholly on physical perpetration; only one step is required. On the other hand, attributing
responsibility for one's thoughts first requires the attribution of the direct perpetrator's acts, and
also requires the attribution of the direct perpetrator's thoughts. The extra step required stretches
the doctrine thin.
The Tribunal has considered the case of a biased indirect perpetrator and an unbiased
direct perpetrator with respect to the crime of persecution. In Stakic, the Trial Chamber held that
an indirect perpetrator (but who was still considered a co-perpetrator for purposes of JCE
liability) may be held liable for the direct perpetrator's persecutory acts if the accused possessed
discriminatory intent in relation to the actual attack. Whether the direct perpetrator acted with or
without discriminatory intent is irrelevant because "the actor may be used as an innocent
instrument or tool only." 318 Requiring proof of discriminatory intent by both the indirect and
direct perpetrators, especially in the context of many acts, "would lead to an unjustifiable
protection of superiors and would run counter to the meaning, spirit and purpose of the
Statute." 319 In these instances the Trial Chamber held that "proof of a discriminatory attack
against a civilian population is a sufficient basis to infer the discriminatory intent of an accused
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for the acts carried out as part of the attack in which he participated as a (co-)perpetrator." 320
This tends to run counter to individual criminal responsibility.
What, then, if the direct perpetrator was biased and his co-perpetrator was unbiased, in
that he did not agree to or intend for the persecutory act to be committed? Again, holding the coperpetrator responsible for the direct perpetrator's thoughts—that is, the discriminatory basis for
directing the crime toward a specific victim—is a dangerous precedent. Persecution should be
reserved for the most culpable individuals who harbor ill-will and hatred towards a group; the
individuals who translate that hurtful animosity into action are the worst threats. Society must
denounce such activity as the worst of the worst, but it must be careful not to overcast the net of
liability. Doing so jeopardizes the principle of individual culpability.

VI.

Suggestions for Improvement
The introduction of the JCE doctrine within the last decade and its subsequent increased

use, especially over the past few years, has proved to be a valuable tool in the ICTY Prosecutor's
arsenal. Individuals have increasingly been charged through their participation in criminal
enterprises rather than through other modes of participation. In fact, JCE has supplanted
command responsibility as the charge of choice, even in cases where a command structure is
present. The doctrine of JCE took several years to catch on, during which time the prosecution
pursued command responsibility as the favored means to liability. But soon thereafter the
prosecution realized the powerful notion of a JCE and began indicting suspected criminals under
both command responsibility and JCE liability. 321 The prosecution has since flipped its favorite

320

Id.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al., Second Amended Indictment for Kosovo, Case No. IT-99-37-PT (Oct.
16, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Second Amended Indictment for Croatia, Case No. IT-02-54-T (July 28, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Amended Indictment for Bosnia, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Apr. 21, 2004).

321

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 109

theories of liability, and now often seeks prosecution through participation in a JCE rather than
through command responsibility.
In order to continue in a legitimate manner, the ICTY should seek to halt its expansion of
the JCE doctrine, especially the third category. Although stare decisis does not bind the
Tribunal, the jurisprudence of the ICTY most likely prevents it from altering its present
standpoint. The birth of the International Criminal Court, however, presents a new opportunity
to preclude certain aspects of this expansive doctrine from gaining a foothold again in
international criminal law. The doctrine itself is not altogether incompatible with international
criminal law, or even with the domestic criminal law of the world's major legal systems, but it
must be modified and clarified before supporting its application. There are two ways in
particular that would strengthen the doctrine.

A. The Significant Contribution Requirement
JCE liability would be strengthened and would gain legitimacy if it required one's
participation to constitute a substantial contribution to the enterprise. The jurisprudence of the
ICTY currently acknowledges that the second category of JCE does require a substantial
contribution to the criminal enterprise. The first and third categories, however, have no such
restriction. This absence poses a serious problem to the issue of causation. Suppose a 13-year
old aspiring insurgent, A, wishes to topple his current regime. Throughout his young life he has
experienced oppression at the hands of his autocratic ruler. In the past few years a budding
insurgency has grown into a formidable opposition and it has piqued his interest. The opposition
is underground, making joining somewhat difficult. Not to be undeterred, A goes to the local
café known for radicalism and, through a series of introductions, meets an individual with scant
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information on joining the insurgency. A then follows the instructions and meets D, a local
leader responsible for a small neighborhood. D has approximately ten fighters under his
command. After testing A's dedication to the cause and willingness to fight, D orders A to
monitor police movements from a rooftop and report back to D everyday. The question, then, is
at what point has A become liable for the acts of the insurgency? Is it when he actively searches
to join the movement? Is it when he has met with D and begun his initiation? Is it when he first
takes an order from D, or when he first steps onto the rooftop for his first assignment? And what
specific acts is he then responsible for? Is he responsible only for the criminal acts resulting
from his rooftop information, or for all the acts of D's cohorts? What about the insurgency as a
whole: Is A responsible for acts committed several hundred miles away, if those acts are
undertaken with the purpose of overthrowing the current regime?
Testing the expansive nature of JCE liability highlights problems with its current
structure. Theoretically, the doctrine could attribute liability to A not only for the acts of D and
his associates but also for the acts of all insurgents fighting for the same cause. Few proponents
of the doctrine have expanded the doctrine to such an extent; however, the lack of current limits
does not preclude such expansion. Thus, there are two related factors involved in this scenario:
the time at which liability attaches, and the specific acts involved at the moment liability
attaches. 322
Requiring a significant contribution to the enterprise would leave A free from liability
until at least the point when he took up position on the rooftop. Before then he had not provided
any assistance to the enterprise. The analysis would then require whether monitoring police
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movements from a rooftop constituted a "significant contribution" to the enterprise, which in turn
requires the defining of the JCE. At the outset of the hypothetical, the JCE was characterized as
being the overthrowing of the regime. Working with this alleged purpose, standing atop a
rooftop may be considered too tenuously connected to activities taking place several hundred
miles away, even if those activities are undertaken with the goal of overthrowing the regime.
But the rooftop lookout is closely related to the acts of D and his cronies, and therefore, when the
criminal enterprise is narrowly defined, those same acts may be considered "significant" rather
than when the criminal enterprise is broadly defined. The significance of the acts should be
directly related to the breadth of the purpose of the alleged JCE. In other words, monitoring the
rooftop is a significant contribution when the purpose of the JCE was the overtaking of
Neighborhood X, but the same act is not a significant contribution when the purpose was the
overthrowing of the central government.

B. The Disallowance of Third-Category Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for
Specific Intent Crimes
Another modification to JCE liability that would strengthen the doctrine's legitimacy
would be to preclude the application of third-category JCE liability to specific intent crimes. In
the U.S., whenever someone commits a heinous crime against another individual based simply
on discrimination, whether race, nationality, religion, or sexual orientation, the community,
rightfully so, condemns such acts as contrary to humanity. Proponents of bias crimes statutes
take to the streets advocating for tougher laws, and legislators debate the merits of such
legislation. Few would disagree that violent acts perpetrated against another solely due that
person's distinguishing characteristics are morally reprehensible. This is not the issue. The issue
is the legislating against thought. The law prohibits certain acts: you may not commit assault
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and battery, you may not kill, you may not rape. The law does not, however, prohibit certain
thoughts; to do so would be tantamount to an Orwellian legal system. As a result, a neo-Nazi
passing by an African-American along the street may wish bad things to the unknowing passerby
simply because of the man's skin color; in fact, the neo-Nazi may even wish to perpetrate that
evil himself. But absent an overt act, the neo-Nazi has committed no crime—this is a fundament
of criminal law. The U.S.' strict adherence to freedom of speech has provided outlets to such
thoughts, unlike countries such as Germany, which have dramatically different historical reasons
for prohibiting certain hateful speech.
What, then, might occur if a white man, with no racist tendencies, became involved with
a small group of neo-Nazis, which then conspires to rob a liquor store? The group enters the
liquor store, and after muttering racist remarks, one of the neo-Nazis abruptly shoots the AfricanAmerican store clerk. The confused others quickly pack up the cash and leave the store. Who is
liable, and for what?
Under U.S. law, it would be reasonably foreseeable that an armed group entering a store
would shoot and kill a store clerk, and thus, all those participating would probably be responsible
for the killing even if that was not within the original purpose of the plan to rob. If killing the
store clerk was planned, then all would certainly be responsible, including the non-racist,
regardless of who actually pulled the trigger. In this case, they all intended to kill the clerk. The
crime of murder, therefore, is not a problem for attributing liability. What about the crime of
murder with a discriminatory purpose? Such a crime is what is proscribed in the ICTY Statute,
under the rubric of persecution as a crime against humanity. Would the non-racist also be
responsible for the heightened crime of murder with a discriminatory purpose, that is, the crime
of persecution within the language of international criminal law?
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The jurisprudence of the ICTY currently leans towards allowing this attribution. The
problem with such attribution is the transferring of thought from one individual to another. Not
only is the act (i.e., the pulling of the trigger) transferred, but the thoughts in the killer's head are
also transferred. Depending on what the killer was thinking at the moment of commission, a
separate individual may be liable for both murder and for persecution. If the killer's mind is
clear, then the other non-direct perpetrator will be charged with murder. If the killer's mind
possessed discriminatory thoughts, the other individual is liable for persecution as well. Specific
intent crimes such as persecution overstretch the third category of JCE liability to its breaking
point. Attributing responsibility to an individual based on another individual's thoughts is
contrary to the fundamentals of individual criminal responsibility. The third category of JCE
liability, therefore, should not be used as a vehicle for attributing liability for specific intent
crimes.
VII.

Conclusion

The crime of persecution in international criminal law is rightfully criminalized. Few
other crimes generate such popular condemnation. In fact, unlike the debate in the U.S. over the
merits of bias crimes legislation, there is hardly anyone that criticizes the criminalization of
persecution. What makes persecution so particularly abhorrent is that it strikes at the diversity
inherent in mankind. Murder, rape, and torture are all odious crimes, but committing them
simply because the individual is Muslim, Christian, Hutu, Tutsi, Shia or Sunni, heightens the
level of brutality. The classification of persecution as a distinct crime has widespread
acceptance, but international criminal tribunals should not be quick to open the floodgates of
liability. The ICTY is in danger of doing just that.
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JCE liability is a new animal in international criminal law. It does have its roots in other
doctrines of the past, thus adding to its credibility, but it is far from a one-hundred percent sound
and warranted legal principle. Hopefully, the International Criminal Court will work out some of
the inconsistencies of the doctrine and clarify other points. The third category of JCE liability
especially suffers from flaws, most notably, the application of this extended form of liability to
specific intent crimes. Relying on this doctrine does facilitate convictions for serious crimes
such as persecution and genocide, but they also "result in discounted convictions that inevitably
diminish the didactic significance of the Tribunal's judgments and that compromise its historical
legacy." 323 An oft-cited purpose of international criminal tribunals is the reconciliation they
promote. As the opening quote to this article states, "promoting reconciliation and restoring true
peace" must be at the forefront of every judgment and every judicial institution. If justice is not
seen to be done by those watching their friends, family, and national heroes on trial, then
resentment will ensue and credibility for the legal process will wane. Extending liability to
another based on the thoughts of the direct perpetrator does not resonate with many peoples'
notions of individual responsibility. Without the people's acceptance of their leaders' and
brethren's convictions, the future of a post-conflict society remains unstable. Hero-worship of
adjudicated criminals does nothing to help the stabilization and reconstruction of fragile
societies. The ICTY itself, perhaps the institution most capable and responsible for maintaining
the balance between personal liability and justice, said it best:
The expansion of mens rea is an easy but dangerous approach. … Stretching notions of individual mens
rea too thin may lead to the imposition of criminal liability on individuals for what is actually guilt by
association, a result that is at odds with the driving principles behind the creation of this International
Tribunal. 324

323
324

Schabas, supra note 20, at 1034.
Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Judgment, ¶ 219 (reference omitted).
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It is hoped that the ICTY heeds its own wise call and reins in the unwarranted expansion of
culpability.
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